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Abstract
This thesis analyses depictive secondary predicates and their restrictions. Depictives can be pred-
icated of either the subject or object of a clause (e.g. Johni ate the fish drunki vs John ate
the fishj rawj). These types are known as Subject-oriented and Object-oriented depictives re-
spectively. Object-oriented depictives show more restrictions in their distribution than Subject-
oriented depictives, e.g. Johni pushed Maryj drunki/∗j . This depends on the verb class, and
Object-oriented depictives are generally most acceptable when predicated of objects of accomplish-
ment verbs. This restriction has led to the claim that Object-oriented depictives are unacceptable
with non-accomplishment verbs. However, this is incorrect, and there are cases of Object-oriented
depictives being acceptable with non-accomplishment verbs, like e.g. John pushed the cartj loadedj .
This thesis addresses this variable acceptability, and presents an account that captures and explains
the difference in acceptability of Object-oriented depictives with different verb classes.
The variable acceptability of Object-oriented (adjectival) depictives with objects of activity verbs
depends on the type of adjective scale used, and this is ultimately due to the depictive’s sensitivity
to quantization. Since quantization surfaces in various domains (e.g. Mass/Count in nominal,
telic/atelic in verbal, Closed/Open scales in adjectival, Stage-Level/Individual-Level predicate in
the predicative domain), this predicts that depictive acceptability should interact with changes in
these domains, which is shown to be borne out. This can be extended to interactions with lexi-
cal aspect more generally, which captures the variable acceptability of Object-oriented depictives
with different verb classes. Based on this, this thesis poses the Depictive Aspectuality Constraint:
Object-oriented depictives and the sentence they are contained within must be aspectually com-
patible with durativity and quantization. This constraint gives a greater empirical coverage of
depictive behaviour than previous analyses, and successfully predicts and explains previously un-
noticed interactions of depictives with other domains.
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A puzzling fact about language is that there are certain constructions that we would expect to be
acceptable, which nonetheless aren’t. In order to approach an explanation of this behaviour, it is
first important to accurately describe the restrictions that these constructions face. This highlights
a difficulty in linguistic theory, namely discovering what governs acceptability in a language, and
how it can vary. Acceptability judgements – whether elicited or inferred from presence in corpora
– form the raw data that linguists work with, and it is vitally important that we understand why
something may or may not be an acceptable sentence of a language.
A simple example is that of ‘grammatically correct’ but ‘meaningless’ sentences, such as #Colorless
green ideas sleep furiously from Chomsky (1957). Syntactically the sentence is fine,1 but semanti-
cally is problematic, as something cannot be both colorless and green, nor can ideas sleep furiously.
Similarly, a sentence with more than three levels of centre-embedding is generally unacceptable in
natural speech due to its syntactic complexity—it can be understood written out, but with some
difficulty. As a final example, we can consider #John slept the baby, which has an interpretable
meaning (John made the baby sleep), but is presumably unacceptable because slept is felt to be an
intransitive verb. While these are all unacceptable sentences, they differ in relative acceptability
as well as the reasons for their unacceptability.
A natural explanation for this would be to say that there are different violations in the sentence:
in whether the sentence is semantically or syntactically unacceptable, or whether the sentence is
too complicated for a hearer to process, or whether something is pragmatically unacceptable. This
is a very useful division, but depends on how one assigns the various behaviours of language to its
component parts, and how those component parts interact. A consequence of this is that when
one is trying to describe and explain the (un)acceptability of sentences, it is necessary to have a
theory that provides the right tools to capture this in an elegant and principled manner.
A theory of human linguistic ability, then, needs to identify what components are important in
generating and understanding sentences, and how these can interact with each other. If we can
identify a particular component – or subcomponent – of how language is structured, then this
allows us to investigate how these might be used in order to explain acceptability. The upshot
of this approach is that we may find that several, seemingly disparate areas can be related by a
single, underlying grammatical basis. If differences in acceptability can be explained by a more
general fact about how language works, then this is an improvement in the simplicity and power
1 Traditionally it would be called ‘well-formed’, following notions of formulas from logic and formal language
theory. However, there are various reasons for avoiding this terminology today, and so I abstain from using it here.
For a discussion of some of the issues, see Ott (2010).
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of our theories about language. In terms of minimal and elegant, we mean a theory that integrates
itself into other known findings of how language works, and relates these restrictions together in
the least complex way possible.
To this end, in this thesis I explore the restrictions on the behaviour of depictives in English, and
what governs their acceptability. Depictives are a subclass of secondary predicates, and are an
‘extra’ or second predicate beyond the usual one. For example, the following sentences contain
adjectival depictives:
(1) a. Johni ate the fish [drunki]
b. John ate the fishi [rawi]
In these cases, the adjectival depictive describes a property which holds of the entity it is predicated
of during the time of the event of the matrix clause. Importantly, we can see that depictives can
either be Subject-Oriented (1a) or Object-Oriented (1b). The focus of this thesis will be on
adjectival depictives and their behaviour, which has proven difficult to accurately capture. This
difficulty has lead to many incorrect generalisations about depictives. For example, a particularly
famous property of depictives is their preference to be Stage-Level Predicates (SLPs), as compared
to Individual-Level Predicates (ILPs) (2). This preference is so strong, that it has lead some
researchers to say that depictives can only be Stage-Level Predicates. However, Individual-Level
Predicates can still serve as depictives (3):
(2) a. ??Johni sat in the car blondi [ILP]
b. Johni sat in the car drunki [SLP]
(3) John died poor
Providing a correct explanation of depictives is compounded by the fact that Subject-Oriented and
Object-Oriented depictives behave differently; Object-Oriented depictives predicated of objects of
certain verb classes show restrictions that their Subject-Oriented counterparts do not have:
(4) a. Johni pushed Maryj drunki/??j [activity]
b. Johni noticed the dogj scaredi/??j [achievement]
c. Johni ate the meatj dryi/j [accomplishment]
Like the Stage-Level Predicates above, the strength of this has lead to the claim that Object-
oriented depictives are unable to be predicated of objects of activity verbs. But while there is a
restriction, some Object-Oriented depictives are still acceptable with activity verbs (5):
(5) a. *John carried the carti brokeni
b. John carried the carti fulli
In short, we have a puzzling set of sentences that contrast in acceptability. Explaining this variable
acceptability, especially of Object-Oriented depictives, will be the major aim of this thesis. As such,
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the first task is to adequately describe the variable acceptability. Reviewing previous accounts, I
will show how these accounts have difficulty in capturing the relevant data, before putting forth
my own account that has greater empirical coverage. I argue that depictives are sensitive to
quantization. This sensitivity especially affects Object-Oriented depictives due to their association
with the object of the sentence, which is involved in measuring out the event.
Quantization is an important concept in theoretical semantics, and cuts across the nominal, verbal,
adjectival, and predicative domains. By focussing on how quantization affects the acceptability
of adjectival depictives, I will demonstrate how the aforementioned restrictions can be unified,
and how quantization reveals larger facts about depictives and their relationship to lexical aspect.
In short, I will show how the various interactions and restrictions of depictives are due to this
underlying sensitivity to quantization.
Using quantization, I give my own novel analysis of depictives that not only accounts for the variable
acceptability in (4) and (5), but also unites several seemingly unrelated facts about depictives. I
demonstrate that introducing quantization into the overall construction can be used to ‘repair’ the
acceptability of depictives. An important finding of this thesis is that this repairing effect can be
achieved through multiple means, since quantization underlies distinctions in several domains (e.g.
Mass/Count in the nominal domain, telic/atelic in the verbal); the overall construction is sensitive
to quantization, but the manner in which quantization is introduced seems irrelevant, only that
quantization is present.
The method by which this is mediated could radically differ depending on the syntactic and se-
mantic frameworks assumed. In order to not tie my analysis to particular mechanisms of a given
framework, I have steered away from giving my own, explicit formal analysis of how quantization
can affect depictive acceptability through different domains. Instead, I give a preformal analysis,
and focus on the properties that a framework would have to account for in order to adequately
capture the behaviour of depictives.
The thesis is laid out into five chapters. In chapter 2, I look at depictives in-depth, and show
their syntactic and semantic properties. I review the empirical data and previous explanations for
their behaviour, and show how there is still much to be explained. The main focus of this chapter
will be to provide a clear definition for what counts as a depictive, and to catalogue its properties
and important factors of its behaviour that are relevant to formulating a proper description of
depictives. In particular, I highlight Object-Oriented depictives and how their variable behaviour
has either been ignored, or has not been properly captured by previous accounts.
In chapter 3, I present a new analysis of depictives. I focus on the variable acceptability of adjecti-
val Object-Oriented depictives predicated of objects of activity verbs, and show how this reveals a
deeper fact about depictives and their properties. I use the concept of adjective scales to show how
this variable acceptability is determined by the type of scale of the adjective used: closed scale adjec-
tives are more acceptable as Object-oriented depictives than open scale ones. I will show that this
distinction between open and closed scales is related to the quantization/homogeneity distinction,
which also underlies the telic/atelic distinction in the verbal domain, the Mass/Count distinction
in the nominal domain, and the Stage-Level/Individual-Level predicate distinction.
Using the quantization/homogeneity distinction, in chapter 4 I revisit the various properties of de-
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pictives discussed in chapter 2, and show how they can be explained by the depictive’s relationship
with quantization. With quantization as a basis, I give an analysis of variable depictive acceptabil-
ity that has greater empirical coverage than other accounts. I also show how my account predicts
that acceptability of a depictive can be improved by introducing quantization into the sentence,
and this prediction is borne out. Importantly, I show that quantization can be introduced into the
sentence through a number of different domains (e.g. nominal, verbal, adjectival, predicative), and
this leads to a corresponding increase in acceptability of depictives.
Based on these data, I propose an aspectual restriction on depictives, the Depictive Aspectuality
Constraint. This constraint shows that these properties are in fact all intimately related to as-
pectual properties of the depictive and the matrix clause it is attaching to. I then extend this
constraint to explain the behaviour of adjectival Object-Oriented depictives with different verb
classes more generally, and show how this correctly predicts previously overlooked interactions of
Object-oriented depictives with achievement verbs.




Depictives are a subclass of secondary predication. The signature trait of secondary predication is
the addition of another predicate that attributes a further property that holds of some element of
the main clause it is added to:1
(1) a. Johni drove home angryi [Depictive]
b. Mary painted the housei redi [Resultative]
In both of these sentences, an ‘extra’ - or second - predicate is present, which adds further in-
formation about the process or result of the main clause. Importantly, they differ in the manner
in which the secondary predicate affects the main clause. In depictives, the secondary predicate
introduces an additional property that holds during the entirety of the event. In (1a), John has
the property of being angry during the event of driving home. In contrast, for resultatives the
addition of the secondary predicate introduces a result state which is achieved through the process
described in the sentence, such as in (1b) - the process of Mary painting the house results in the
house becoming red. From this difference, secondary predicates are categorised into two different
types:2 depictives, (1a), and resultatives, (1b).
Secondary predication can differ substantially across languages, which is an issue that is com-
pounded by the difficulty in distinguishing secondary predication from similar constructions. As
such, a large problem in tackling depictives is first identifying what counts as a depictive. A re-
sult of this is that, multiple researchers have introduced different definitions of what counts as a
‘true’ depictive secondary predicate, and in many cases, these are conflicting, and depend on the
theoretical analysis the authors adopt.
A consideration of the theoretical analysis used for secondary predicates is especially important, as
a key aim of theorists working on secondary predication is to integrate secondary predicates into
a larger account of predication. As such, they often serve as a test-bed for distinguishing between
different accounts of predication. I will follow the seven criteria for depictives given by Schultze-
Berndt and Himmelmann (2004, pp. 77-78) as a pretheoretical definition of a depictive:
(i) It contains two separate predicative elements, the main predicate and the depictive, where
1 The index indicates what the secondary predicate is predicated of. I will omit this in cases where the relationship
is unambiguous, or the orientation of the depictive is specified.
2 The terms come from Halliday (1967), which is the earliest detailed description of the phenomena (though
there are earlier mentions, e.g. Jespersen, 1954). Halliday also outlines a third type of secondary predicate, the
circumstantial (also known as a conditional). However, I will argue that this is a type of depictive.
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the state of affairs expressed by the depictive holds within the time frame of the eventuality
expressed by the main predicate.
(ii) The depictive is obligatorily controlled, i.e., there exists a formal relation to one participant
of the main predicate, the controller, which is usually interpreted as a predicative relationship
(i.e., the depictive predicates an eventuality of the controller). The controller is not expressed
separately as an argument of the depictive.
(iii) The depictive makes a predication about its controller which is at least in part independent
of the predication conveyed by the main predicate, i.e., the depictive does not form a complex
or periphrastic predicate with the main predicate.
(iv) The depictive is not an argument of the main predicate, i.e., it is not obligatory.
(v) The depictive does not form a low-level constituent with the controller, i.e., it does not
function as a modifier of the controller.
(vi) The depictive is non-finite (to be understood as: not marked for tense or mood categories),
or the dependency of the depictive on the main predicate is indicated in other formal ways.
(vii) The depictive is part of the same prosodic unit as the main predicate.
While I will define depictives based on cross-linguistic considerations, I will concentrate on depic-
tives in English for this thesis. I do this because even though English is one of the most well-studied
of languages in regards to secondary predication, there have been a number of common claims about
depictives in English that, as mentioned in the previous chapter, appear not to be warranted. This
is especially important as English provides a useful first case for dividing up data about depictives,
as depictives can be more readily distinguished from other, related constructions that are not so
clearly distinguished in other languages.
Given this, the syntactic and semantic properties of the depictive need to be considered. In this
chapter, I will review depictives and their properties. In order to continue a more in-depth analysis
of the properties of depictives, there are a number of questions that need to be answered about de-
pictives. I divide these into syntactic and semantic questions, looking at both in turn. Syntactically,
the position and how the depictive is integrated into the sentence needs to be decided:
1. are depictives adjuncts or complements?
2. what projection do they attach to?
3. what (if anything) mediates the predicative relationship between the depictive secondary
predicate and the main predicate?
Semantically, the depictive is associated with the main predicate, though to what extent they need
to match and what the depictive contributes semantically is important:
1. what are the possible semantic restrictions on depictives?
2. how does the depictive align temporally with the matrix event?
3. are depictives required to be interpreted in particular way?
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I look at these questions in turn. I focus first on the basic distributional data of depictives, before
considering related constructions and how they are distinguished from depictives. I then look
further in-depth at the syntax of depictives, especially in regards to the position of depictives in
the syntax tree, and the questions laid out above. I then consider the semantics of the depictive
construction, and how depictives add properties to an entity of the main clause. Finally, I lay out
the basic framework I will be adopting in my analysis of depictives, and pose two main questions
that I seek to answer in this thesis.
2.1 The distribution of depictives in English
To begin, it is useful to look at the general distributional data for depictives in English. Per-
haps most importantly, depictives can be predicated of either the subject or the object of a sen-
tence:
(2) a. Johni saluted Mary drunki
b. John saluted Maryi drunki
The former is a Subject-Oriented Depictive (SOD), while the latter is an Object-Oriented Depictive
(OOD), and referred to generally as depictives. Depictives can be APs, PPs, or DPs3
(3) a. Maryi drove home [AP drunk]i
b. Jamesi left the meeting [PP in tears]i
c. Jamesi returned [DP a blonde]i
Adjectival depictives are the most common type of depictive and are generally far freer in their
distribution than depictives of other types. PP depictives are the next most common, though show
some restrictions that adjectival depictives do not. DP depictives are much rarer, and tend to be
the most restricted in their distribution. Unlike adverbs, depictives of all types cannot precede the
verb, and a depictive must follow the NP arguments of the main clause:
(4) a. *He drunk drove the car
b. He drunkenly drove the car
(5) a. *He ate drunk the meat
b. *He ate raw the meat
Depictives can follow or precede PPs when the main verb is intransitive. When the main verb is
transitive, the OODs can follow or precede PPs, but SODs are preferred following the object:
3 Theorists appear to differ on whether there are VP depictives (e.g. Williams, 1975; Truswell, 2007; Asada, 2012)
or not (e.g. Aarts, 1995; Rothstein, 2004). Rothstein (2006) notes that some participial modifiers may be considered
secondary predicates.
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(6) a. John running naked into the room was a mistake
b. John running into the room naked was a mistake
(7) a. (i) He returned the meati to the butcher rawi
(ii) He returned the meati rawi to the butcher
b. (i) Hei returned the meat to the butcher nakedi
(ii) ??Hei returned the meat nakedi to the butcher
The argument predicated of must be syntactically present, and implicit objects and implicit agents
of passives are not acceptable:4
(8) a. (i) John ate (the meat)
(ii) John ate *(the meati) rawi
b. (i) Hei rented the car to John drunki
(ii) *The car was rented to John drunk
Depictives are within the scope of negation, as compared to appositive adjectives:
(9) a. John didn’t arrive drunk
b. John didn’t arrive, drunk
This can be seen in the difference in meaning for the above sentences. The sentence in (9a) can only
mean that John either wasn’t drunk when he arrived, or that he didn’t arrive at all. Compare this
to (9b), in which the pause in intonation (represented orthographically by the comma) allows for
the appositive adjective drunk to give the reason for why John didn’t arrive. Likewise, depictives
are in the focal domain (Winkler, 1997).
While depictives can generally be predicated of any bare DP inside a VP, OODs have a number
of syntactic restrictions that SODs don’t. OODs must precede nonfinite VP adjuncts (10a), and
cannot be predicated of prepositional objects (10b):
(10) a. (i) Eating the meati rawi to impress their friends was a poor choice
(ii) *Eating the meati to impress their friends rawi was a poor choice
b. (i) John stuffed the meati into the car rawi
(ii) *John stuffed the car with meati rawi
OODs also behave in interesting ways with double object constructions—while ditransitives can
have their direct object predicated of, it is often claimed that indirect objects cannot be predicated
of:
4 But as Stroik (1992, 132, fn. 7) notes, this seems to be variable:
(i) a. The room was left sad
b. That painting was painted blindfolded
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(11) a. I gave John the meati rawi
b. *I gave Johni the meat hungryi
However, this restriction is not entirely accurate, since it does not always hold. When using give
as a light verb, the indirect object is predicable of:
(12) a. The nurse gave the patienti his medication still-groggyi/half-asleepi
b. Victorian doctors preferred to give their female patientsi a physical exam fully-dressedi
(Example from Maling, 2001)
Further, if the object is moved as in the unaccusative form, or the passive or pseudopassive form,
then the moved entity can be predicated of (M. Koizumi, 1994):
(13) a. (i) Hei got t the news drunki
(ii) *I gave himi the news drunki
b. (i) Ii was told the news drunki
(ii) *He told mei the news drunki
c. (i) Maryi was talked to drunki
(ii) *I talked to Maryi drunki
This raises two main questions; what is the structure of depictives, and how do they attach to
the main sentence? To formulate an answer to these questions, it is first useful to look at related
constructions for clues about the structure and interpretation of depictives. By identifying the class
of constructions that depictives belong to and contrasting them, we can reveal more information
about specific syntactic and semantic properties of depictives.
2.2 Depictives as Participant-Oriented Adjuncts
Himmelmann and Schultze-Berndt (2005) note that depictives are very similar to other construc-
tions, such as circumstantials, participant-oriented manner adverbials and weak free adjuncts. They
classify depictives along with these constructions as being a part of the general class of participant-
oriented adjuncts. By participant-oriented, it is meant that depictives are particularly about the
entities they are predicated of, as compared to being predicated of an event that the entities are
involved in. Consider:
(14) Johni saluted drunki
Here, drunk adds further information to the base sentence John saluted, but in a manner that is
different from usual adverbial modification. While it does not fundamentally change the overall
event, it crucially specifies something about the entity of which the depictive is predicated. To see
this, compare (14) with (15):
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(15) John saluted drunkenly
The adverb drunkenly differs from the depictive drunk in that the former describes and modifies the
event, whereas the latter has a tighter link to the participant; the adverb can be used to describe
a situation in which John is pretending to be drunk or performs the action in a drunken manner
(e.g. as an actor), whereas the depictive is only licit in cases where John is actually drunk:
(16) a. John saluted drunkenly... but of course he was actually sober
b. He saluted drunk... #but of course he was actually sober
While differing from adverbs in an important way, depictives are still adjuncts. The evidence for
the adjunct status of depictives comes from a number of different bases.5 First of all, as a classic
sign of adjuncthood, more than one depictive can appear in a sentence:
(17) a. John ate the meati rawi tenderi
b. John danced the tango nakedi drunki
Second, depictives are always optional. To illustrate this, a useful comparison is a related construc-
tion that shows similar behaviour (but is not a part of the participant-oriented adjuncts class):
the predicative complement construction. Predicative complements are similar to depictives in
that they relate a secondary element to the main predicate of a sentence. However, crucially, this
second element is not optional and appears to be subcategorised for:
(18) a. Rocks serve them [as support]
b. Mary prefers her coffee [black]
Given a lack of overt morphological differences, predicative complements can be difficult to distin-
guish from depictives, and in many languages it appears there is no clear distinction. However,
Bucheli Berger (2005) shows evidence of a generalised depictive marker in Swiss German dialects
which is not found on predicative complements, suggesting that they are distinct constructions.
Depictives can also often be predicated of either the subject or the object of the main clause,
which shows a much freer distribution than would be expected from a complement.6
When analysing depictives, it is important to be able to identify what counts as a depictive and
what is merely a similar construction. In this section, I will compare depictives to the other
members of the class of participant-oriented adjuncts. Identifying the similarities and differences
of these constructions reveals more information about the structure and use of depictives, and gives
us a better idea of the syntactic and semantic properties that depictives have.
5 Though theorists differ over this question, with some maintaining that depictives are solely adjuncts (e.g. Carrier
and Randall, 1992; Chomsky, 1981; Dowty, 1979; Goldberg, 1995; Green, 1973; Rothstein, 1983; Williams, 1980;
Winkler, 1997), and others arguing that some depictives are complements (e.g. Halliday, 1967; Napoli, 1989; Nichols,
1978; Simpson, 2005).
6 Also see Simpson (2005), who argues that the evidence for the adjuncthood of depictives can be weakened by
analysing the selectional restrictions of English depictives in comparison to depictives in Warlpiri. She presents an
argument that the secondary predicate in sentences like They returned drunk should be analysed as a complement.
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2.2.1 Circumstantials and free adjuncts
Circumstantial secondary predicates7 appear to be very similar to depictives, with the semantic
differences being slight. The main noted difference is that depictives ‘purely’ have temporal overlap
between the events of the main predicate and the secondary predicate, whereas circumstantials
appear to contain further ‘semantic links’ that go beyond this relationship, and originate from the
secondary predicate. Nichols (1978) divides these ‘semantic links’ up into the subtypes of condition,
concession, and temporal :
(19) a. I can work hungry [condition]
b. Even dead I won’t forget [concession]
c. I knew him young [temporal]
While circumstantials are very similar to depictives they behave differently under negation and
focus. In terms of negation, depictives can have either the main and secondary predicate negated,
or just the secondary predicate by itself:
(20) a. Johni didn’t arrive drunki
b. (i) John arrived and he wasn’t drunk
(ii) John didn’t arrive at all
In contrast, in the circumstantial it is possible to negate just the main predicate without negating
the secondary predicate:
(21) Johni can’t work hungryi
In (20), the depictive is within the domain of negation, so the only two possible readings are that
John either wasn’t drunk when he arrived, or he didn’t arrive at all. Compare this to (21), in
which hungry denotes the circumstance in which John can’t work.
Authors differ on whether circumstantials are a subtype of depictives, or their own class. Simpson
(1983), for example, argues that circumstantials are another type of secondary predicate, whereas
others suggest that they are essentially depictives under the scope of a modal operator (Himmel-
mann & Schultze-Berndt, 2005; Simpson, 2005; Rothstein, 2006). This relationship is further
complicated by the introduction of the free adjunct construction, which is strikingly similar to
circumstantials. Free adjuncts are sentence-level adverbials that lack an overt linker to the main
clause. Free adjuncts can be split up into strong and weak subtypes, following Stump (1985):
(22) a. Having unusually long arms, John can touch the ceiling [strong]
b. Standing on a chair, John can touch the ceiling [weak]
7 Circumstantials are also known as conditionals (Halliday, 1967), or ‘appositive depictives’ (Motut, 2010). It
should be noted that ‘circumstantial’ and ‘conditional’ are both used for a number of different things through the
related literature. Halliday’s use of ‘circumstantial’ refers to the group consisting of beneficiaries, range, attributives,
and his version of circumstantials (which he calls conditionals). Some authors use circumstantial to refer particularly
to object-oriented depictives.
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Strong and weak free adjuncts differ in a number of respects. First and foremost, strong free ad-
juncts are outside the clause headed by the primary predicate, and so are not secondary predicates.
They also differ in entailment strengths; the strong free adjunct is always entailed by the truth
of the whole sentence, whereas this is not always the case for weak free adjuncts (Stump, 1985,
p. 41). The difference seems to stem from the meaning of the adjunct. It is proposed that weak
free adjuncts are derived from Stage-Level Predicates (SLPs), whereas strong free adjuncts are
derived from Individual-Level Predicates (ILPs). SLPs are temporally restricted states that holds
of a particular time, whereas ILPs denote more permanent properties (Kratzer, 1995). This shows
another similarity to depictives, which prefer SLPs over ILPs:
(23) a. Mary arrived eager
b. *Mary arrived intelligent
Weak free adjuncts pattern very closely to circumstantial secondary predicates, and Himmelmann
and Schultze-Berndt (2005) propose that circumstantials and weak free adjuncts are the same
construction.8
2.2.2 Participant-Oriented Adverbs
In depictives the attributed property holds specifically of the predicated entity of the depictive
during the event in the main clause, and can’t hold of just the event itself. This is different from
adverbial modification, in which the adverb can modify the entire event:
(24) a. John drove home angrily, but he was only pretending
b. #John drove home angry, but he was only pretending
In the adverbial form, (24a), it can be that the event of John driving home took place while John
was merely pretending to be angry. Compare this to the depictive, (24b), where John actually
has to be angry during the event of driving home, and suggesting otherwise renders the sentence
infelicitous. This is similar to nominal modification, where the depictive predicate must hold for
the entirety of the event, but the nominal modifier need not:
(25) a. The angry man drove home, after he had calmed down
b. #The man drove home angry, after he had calmed down
While this is a useful split, it is not a cut and dried distinction. Jackendoff (1972) notes that
certain adverbs can occupy positions in a sentence which causes a distinct change in their meaning,
while others don’t:
(26) a. (i) John quickly dropped his cup of coffee
(ii) Quickly, John dropped his cup of coffee
(iii) John dropped his cup of coffee quickly
b. (i) John cleverly dropped his cup of coffee
8 But see Rothstein (2011) for an argument to the contrary.
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(ii) Cleverly, John dropped his cup of coffee
(iii) John dropped his cup of coffee cleverly
In (26a), quickly shows no real change in meaning, whereas in (26bi), the sentence is ambiguous
between the two readings of (26bii) and (26biii), which can be paraphrased respectively as:
(27) a. It was clever of John to drop his cup of coffee
b. The manner in which John dropped his coffee was clever
Jackendoff distinguishes these as subject-oriented9 (27a), and manner adverbs (27b). Following
Geuder (2000), these are oriented adverbs, and form part of the class of participant-oriented ad-
juncts. Oriented adverbs can be further split into transparent, agentive, and result adverbs:10
(28) a. John stupidly answered the question [transparent]
b. John angrily broke open the door [agentive]
c. John loaded the cart heavily [result adverb]
Oriented adverbs are participant-oriented like depictives, but differ in a number of ways depending
on their subclass. Result adverbs, (28c), differ in having a result relation in their interpretation,
which is clearly different from depictives. Agentive adverbs, (28b) are only found at the beginning
of the sentence or prior to the auxiliary in English, whereas depictives generally follow the first
predicate. Depictives further differ in that they can refer to participants that aren’t the agent, and
don’t predicate over the state of affairs. For example:
(29) a. (i) John answered the question stupidly [pure manner]
(ii) It was stupid of John to answer the question
b. (i) John answered the questions drunk
(ii) ??It was drunk of John to answer the question
Finally, transparent adverbs (28a) differ from depictives in that “depictives assert the independence
of a concurrent state while the adverbial forms assert the existence of a closer factual connection
to the event.” (Geuder, 2000, p. 213). Consider:
(30) a. The boyi returned to his parents hungryi
b. The boy hungrily returned to his parents
(Example adapted from Geuder, 2000)
9 Also known as agent-oriented, e.g. Ernst (2002).
10 Geuder uses the term resultative. But since this invites confusion with resultative secondary predicates, I use the
term result adverb instead. Geuder also distinguishes another type of adverb as being a pure manner adverb, which
makes up the manner adverb class along with transparent, agentive, and result adverbs. Pure manner adverbs,
however, are event-oriented adverbs, and so are distinguishable from depictives and the rest of the participant-
oriented adverbs.
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In (30a), the state of the boy being hungry merely overlaps with the event described in the main
clause. Compare this to (30b), where there is an apparent motivational link between the adverb
and the event of returning.
Given the relatedness of these constructions, this provides further support for the view that depic-
tives are adjuncts, but form a distinct construction from the others. The broad conclusion I draw
from this is that depictives form part of the overall class of participant-oriented adjuncts, and have
similar syntactic and semantic properties that are shared with the rest of this class. This goes some
way to explaining the difficulty of distinguishing depictives in other languages that don’t show overt
differences, as well as providing a basis for investigating the depictive construction.
2.3 Syntactic properties of depictives
I now turn to a deeper consideration of the syntax of the depictive construction and its various
properties and interactions with the structure of the sentence it is integrated into. Notably, SODs
and OODs differ in their distribution and restrictions, and so an important question is where
SODs and OODs are attached within the syntax tree. We can see that long distance wh-extraction
results in unacceptability, showing depictives behave like adjuncts, as we concluded in the previous
section.
(31) a. *How rawi does Mary wonder whether John ate the meati?
b. *How drunki does Mary wonder whether Johni ate the meat?
While the exact position of the OOD has been debated, it is generally accepted that they are
adjoined somewhere within the VP,11 though accounts do differ between whether this is at a bar-
level (e.g. Hornstein and Lightfoot, 1987; Bowers, 1993) or as a sister to the verb (e.g. Schein,
1995), or to the DP itself (e.g. Isac, 2005).12 In contrast, theorists have differed much more
substantively over the position of the SOD, with some theorists claiming that it is also inside the
VP (e.g. Andrews, 1982; Culicover and Wilkins, 1984; McNulty, 1988; Roberts, 1988; Isac, 2005),
while others have claimed it is outside the VP (e.g. Williams, 1980; Rothstein, 1983; Demonte,
1987, 1991; Nakajima, 1990; Schein, 1995; Bowers, 2001).
Andrews (1982) uses a variety of tests to suggest that SODs occur within the VP. He argues that
VP preposing, Though movement, and Wh-clefting of the VP (pseudoclefting) show that the SOD
is affected by operations targeting the VP, and so the SOD is within the VP. Applying his tests, if
SODs were generated outside the VP, then we would expect the SOD and OOD to react differently
to VP preposing and whether the depictive can be left behind:
(32) a. John wanted to leave the room happy and leave the room happy he did
b. *John wanted to leave the room happy and leave the room he did happy
11 I use VP here to mean bare VP unless otherwise explicitly noted. Other discussions of the split between analysing
SODs as being within or outside the VP often differ on whether they consider being inside the extended VP as
being a part of the VP.
12 Post Bare Phrase Structure (Chomsky, 1994), it is not clear how the distinction between adjoining at V′ and
VP is maintained.
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(33) a. John wanted to drink the beer flat and drink the beer flat he did
b. *John wanted to drink the beer flat and drink the beer he did flat
On the SOD external to the VP account, we would then expect the SOD (32b) to be acceptable,
while the OOD (33b) would be unacceptable. However, as we can see, they’re both unaccept-
able. Pseudoclefting tests and Though movement also show no difference between SODs and
OODs:
(34) a. (i) *What Johni did happyi was leave the room
(ii) What Johni did was leave the room happyi
b. (i) *What John did raw was eat the carrots
(ii) What John did was eat the carrotsi rawi
(35) a. (i) Eat the meat drunk though John did, nobody thought he was crazy
(ii) *Eat the meat though John did drunk, nobody thought he was crazy13
b. (i) Eat the meat raw though John did, nobody thought he was crazy
(ii) *Eat the meat though John did raw, nobody thought he was crazy
A further piece of evidence cited is the well-known fact that depictives are inside the domain of
negation. Most importantly, SODs and OODs are both inside the scope of negation, and SODs do
not show ambiguity like high attached adjuncts:
(36) a. Maryi didn’t eat the meat nakedi [SOD]
b. Mary didn’t eat the meati rawi [OOD]
c. Mary didn’t eat the meat, deliberately [High attached adjunct]
As mentioned, it is generally agreed upon that there is a height difference between SODs and
OODs, with the former being attached higher than the latter. This is supported by sentences with
multiple depictives—they are subject to ordering conditions, and while SODs can follow OODs,
OODs cannot follow SODs:
(37) a. Johni ate the meatj rawj nakedi
b. *Johni ate the meatj nakedi rawj
Likewise, SODs can be fronted, while OODs cannot.
(38) a. Furiousi, Johni submitted the manuscript
b. *Incompletei, John submitted the manuscripti
13 On my judgement, I would mark this ??, especially if heavy focus is put on drunk.
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Evidence from binding also provides support for a height difference, with a sentence being unac-
ceptable if the pronoun is coindexed with its referent in the OOD:14
(39) a. *Mary met [himi]y [angry about Johni]y
b. *Sue met [himi]y [proud about Fredi]y
Roberts (1988) argues that if the pronouns are c-commanding the referents, then Condition C
will rule these out, explaining the unacceptability of the examples. Roberts also uses a similar
argument involving reflexives and reciprocals to further show a height difference.
(40) a. * [Mary]x met Johni [angry at himselfi]x
b. Mary met [Johni]y [angry at himselfi]y
In (40a), John cannot be the antecedent of the reflexive inside the SOD, but in the OOD in (40b),
it can be. Roberts argues that this shows the SOD is outside the c-command domain of the
object, John, whereas the OOD is inside. If the reflexive is flipped to be predicated of Mary, the
judgements shift to the converse:
(41) a. [Maryi]x met John [angry at herselfi]x
b. *Maryi met [John]y [angry at herselfi]y
In (41), Mary can be the antecedent of the reflexive inside of the SOD, but not the OOD. Sentences
with reciprocals show the same contrast:
(42) a. (i) * [John]x met the studentsi [angry at each otheri]x
(ii) John met [the studentsi]y [angry at each otheri]y
b. (i) [The studentsi]x met John [angry at each otheri]y
(ii) *The studentsi met [John]y [angry at each otheri]y
Do-so replacement tests show that the VP is a constituent, and the OOD is inside the VP:15
14 The following examples are from Roberts (1988). For binding examples only, I use brackets with x and y for
depictive orientation, and usual index marks as traditionally used to indicate binding/coindexation.
15 But these are variable. I have tested these sentences on other speakers and they find them marginally acceptable.
I’ve also tested similar constructions, which they (and myself) find fully acceptable:
(i) a. John drank the beer warm and James did so cold
b. (Yesterday) John drank beer warm and James did so cold
What a do-so test shows depends on assumptions about the structure of the VP, and about phrase structure
in general. If VPs can have more than one bar-level, and on the assumption that do-so proform tests replace V′
(Winkler, 1997, p. 29), then this is rather inconclusive about the placement in the VP. Alternatively, do-so is viewed
as necessarily replacing elements inside the VP, but adjuncts adjoined to the VP need not be replaced (Lakoff &
Ross, 1976; Zagona, 1988).
Ike-Uchi (1990) also notes that some wh-extractions of OODs are judged acceptable or marginally acceptable by
many speakers:
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(43) a. *Fred ate the meat raw, but I did so cooked (Simpson, 1983)
b. ?Julie drank the tequila cold, but Jem did so warm (Winkler, 1997)
We can compare this to resultatives and SODs. We can see that with do-so tests, OODs pattern
closer to resultatives than SODs, where a resultative is standardly taken to be a complement to
the verb:
(44) a. John fastened the shutters open, and Mary did so shut
b. *Jason wiped the table tired and Mary did so awake (Levin & Hovav, 1995)
This shows that the OOD is at a height between a SOD and a resultative. Where an OOD
must be then depends on where a SOD attaches within the tree; if a SOD is inside the VP, then
an OOD must be too.16 Most importantly, the tests by Andrews (1982) do not always produce
unacceptable sentences. For example, the SOD can be left stranded in the pseudocleft construction
in some sentences, contrary to (34a).
(45) a. What Johni did drunki was drive the car
b. What Johni did was drive his car drunki
Second, Nakajima (1990) argues that Andrews’ tests can’t be evidence for VP-internal adjuncts,
as there are independent restrictions on stranding the SOD from the primary predicate. Nakajima
argues this on the basis that temporal adjuncts can remain, whereas SODs cannot:
(46) a. John left the university at five o’clock, and Mary will, at six o’clock
b. *John drove home drunk, and Mary will, sober
Third, negative polarity items in OODs can be licensed by the subject, but they cannot be licensed
in SODs by the object. On the assumption that the object is in Spec,VP (Hale & Keyser, 1993),
then this shows that the SOD must be higher than the VP:
(47) a. No onei read the book [critical of anything else]i
b. No one read newspapersi [hot off any press]i
c. *Johni read no book [critical of anything else]i
(ii) a. How raw did John eat the meat?
b. How drunk did you meet John?
c. How young did John buy the mare?
d. How did John drink his coffee yesterday?
He proposes that extraction of all OODs is grammatical, but many are unacceptable due to intervening semantic
or pragmatic factors. The issue of extraction out of secondary predicate adjuncts is beyond the scope of this thesis,
though it does appear to be related to lexical aspect (Truswell, 2007).
16 Some theorists (e.g. M. Koizumi, 1994) claim SODs can be generated both inside and outside of the VP.
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d. John read no newspaperi [hot off any press]i
(Example from Ike-Uchi, 1990)
This then raises the question; if the SOD is outside the VP, then what projection is it attached to?
Theorists have differed on this, and have given a wide variety of suggestions, ranging from AgrS
(Dechaine, 1993; Gueron & Hoekstra, 1995), IP (Rothstein, 1983; Nakajima, 1990), to PrP/VoiceP
(Bowers, 2001; Pylkkanen, 2008).
Nakajima (1990) argues for SODs being external to the VP and adjoined to IP. He bases this on
the results of extraposition from NP and heavy NP shift tests. He notes that OODs can appear to
the left of extrapositions from the subject or the object, but SODs can only appear to the left of
extraposition from the subject, and not to the left of extraposition from the object:17
(48) a. [Many Americans t] eat fishi rawi [who are interested in something Japanese]
b. John ate [the fishi t] rawi [which he bought at Legal Seafoods]
(49) a. [A mani t] left happyi [who had a plan to build a new house in the suburbs]
b. *Billi left [the party t] angryi [which my wife had prepared since last weekend]
On his assumption that extrapositions from the subject are adjoined to the IP and that extra-
positions from the object are adjoined to the VP, Nakajima concludes that SODs are associated
with the IP, and so cannot appear to the left of extraposition from the object. However, Winkler
(1997, p. 63) points out that this argument is considerably weakened by evidence from Culicover
and Rochemont (1990) and Rochemont and Culicover (1990) that shows that extraposition from
the subject must be able to attach to the VP. If this is the case, then this argument merely shows
that there are height differences between the SOD and OOD, but not that the SOD is outside the
VP.
On a similar line of argument, Nakajima also notes that under heavy NP shift tests, the heavy NP
can’t be moved to the right of the SOD, but it can be moved to the right of the OOD:
(50) a. John ate t raw [the fish which he bought at Legal Seafoods last week]
b. *John left t angry [the awful party where everyone was drunk and rowdy]18
This depends on the assumption that the landing site of the heavy NP is the VP. However, as
Winkler (1997, p. 63) points out again, not only is this assumption questionable,19 but it shows
17 The following examples are from Nakajima (1990)
18 However, this is found acceptable by some speakers, and improves if an indefinite determiner is used. E.g.
(i) John left t angry [an awful party where everyone was drunk and rowdy]
19 This is on the grounds that there is a ban on rightwards movement (Kayne, 1994), and that Heavy NP Shift is
better analysed as light verb raising (Larson, 1988a). However, this ban has been increasingly questioned in recent
years, and in fact Heavy NP Shift appears to be a case of rightwards movement.
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only that heavy NPs are adjoined lower than SODs, which argues for a height difference between
SODs and OODs, but not necessarily for an SOD external to the VP approach.
To help determine the position of the SOD, it is useful to look at similar types of adjuncts, and
what positions they have. Adverbials of a similar or same kind tend not to co-occur (Jackendoff,
1972; Cinque, 1999), and we can see that manner adverbs can co-occur with SODs, but not OODs
(Hornstein & Lightfoot, 1987):
(51) a. John ate the meat greedily naked
b. *John ate the meat greedily raw
Tellingly, manner adverb and SODs cannot be reversed, with manner adverbs always preceding
SODs:
(52) a. (i) John ate the meat quickly naked
(ii) *John ate the meat naked quickly
b. (i) John hit the dog sharply angry
(ii) *John hit the dog angry sharply
This is a useful diagnostic for the relative height of these two constructions, and this suggests that
OODs are similar in their layer to manner adverbs, while SODs aren’t in the same class or of
the same type of manner adverbs. Rather, SODs are closer to the height of temporal or locative
adverbials. SODs can precede or follow temporal and locative adverbials, while OODs prefer to
precede them.
(53) a. John rode the tram in Melbourne drunk
b. John rode the tram last night drunk
(54) a. (i) John ate the meat raw in the restaurant
(ii) ?/??John ate the meat in the restaurant raw20
b. (i) John drank the beer cold last night
(ii) ?/??John drank the beer last night cold
As we have already seen, manner adverbs do not differ significantly in the meanings they can have
depending on their position. This is different from depictives, and we can see this in that SODs can
serve as restrictors, while manner adverbs resist restrictor status when used with habitual sentences
(Müller-Bardey, 2005). Take, for example, a locative adverbial versus a manner adverb.
(55) a. On the roof, John drinks
b. John drinks on the roof
20 There is some interference in these judgements because the locative or temporal adverbial may be parsed as an
entire NP, e.g. the meat in the restaurant.
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(56) a. Carefully, John climbs the wall
b. John climbs the wall carefully
While (55) shows a difference in interpretation depending on whether the adverbial is fronted or
not, (56) does not. The different interpretation available for the locative adverbial is that of a
restrictor; (55a) can be interpreted as that when on the roof, what John does is drink, whereas
(55b) only holds that if John drinks, it is (at least sometimes) on the roof. (56) doesn’t show this
ambiguity. Compare this to a depictive:
(57) a. Drunk, John drives very dangerously
b. John drives very dangerously drunk
Instead of merely adding further information about the manner of the habitual action, the general
reading of these sentences is that of the restrictor interpretation. When John is drunk, he drives
very dangerously.21 Here, it is useful to talk more about what the restrictor does. On a tripartite
model of restricted quantification, we can distinguish between the quantifier (Q), the things that
are mapped to the restrictor (R), and the things that are mapped to the nuclear scope (N) (von
Fintel, 1994).
(58) [Qx :R(x )] N(x )
A restrictor (or restrictive clause) restricts the quantifier to only quantify over individuals that
meet its property. The nuclear scope indicates a property or relationship that the individuals have.
Consider a domain of discourse about a university in which there are only students or professors,
we can then say:
(59) a. Some left
b. ∃x LEAVE(x )
There is no restriction on who left refers to, so this statement is true in any case that at least one
person left, i.e. this statement is true if only some students left, only some professors, or a mixture.
If we add a restrictor, we can see how this changes the truth-conditions of the sentence:22
(60) a. Some students left
b. [∃x: STUDENT(x )] LEAVE(x )
Given the restrictor students, this statement is true if and only if there was at least one student that
left. A restrictor, then, puts restrictions on what members of the domain of discourse can satisify
the predicate. On the Mapping Hypothesis (Diesing, 1992), the syntactic position determines
whether material is mapped to the nuclear clause or the restrictor.
21 I do not find (57a) particularly ambiguous, however, Müller-Bardey (2005, p. 107) states that depictives are less
likely to function as a condition for habituality in the postverbal position.
22 The use of plural marking most likely entails more than one, but I’ve purposefully simplified this for the sake of
the example.
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(61) Mapping Hypothesis: Material inside the VP is mapped to the nuclear scope. Material in
the IP is mapped to a restrictive clause.
We can use this to explain the ambiguity of (55), and the nonambiguity of (56) and (57). Locative
adverbials can appear inside or outside of the VP, whereas manner adverbs only appear inside the
VP; we can see that two locative adverbials can easily co-occur, as compared to manner adverbs
which we already know resist co-occurence.
(62) a. John lives in Melbourne in a CBD apartment
b. ??John washes the car happily carefully
(63) a. In Melbourne, John lives in a CBD apartment23
b. ??Carefully, John washes the car happily
On the Mapping Hypothesis, when fronted, locative adverbials are mapped to the restrictor, as
they are outside the VP. When locative adverbs follow the matrix clause, they are mapped to the
nuclear scope, since they are inside the VP. Manner adverbs cannot be mapped to the restrictor
since they are always located inside the VP, and hence there is no difference in meaning. We
know that SODs are higher than manner adverbs, and are similar in height to locative adverbials.
Further, they are most likely higher since SODs prefer the restrictor interpretation. Thus, we
conclude that SODs are outside the VP, as they are outside nuclear scope.
Traditionally, temporal and locative adverbs are taken to be within the VP (Jackendoff, 1977;
Andrews, 1982), but the restrictor data suggests that they and the SOD are generated outside the
VP, and are adjoined higher up. These seemingly contradictory points of data are reconcilable on
an extended VP approach. The SOD is thus within the extended VP, but outside the bare VP.24
With the view of the extended VP, we can then revise Diesing’s Mapping Hypothesis:
(64) Mapping Hypothesis (Larson’s revision): Lowest material from VP is mapped to the nuclear
scope. The residue is mapped to a restrictive clause.
(Definition from Larson, 2004, p. 32)
I argue that the SOD attaches to the VoiceP projection. I do this for three main reasons. First,
I adopt the hypothesis that VoiceP is the site of introducing the external argument, which is
separated from the verb. As such, this is the point at which the subject is introduced, and so is
naturally the point where an SOD should be in order to be predicated of the subject. The second
is that a VoiceP analysis can be used to reduce both primary and secondary predication down to
a single predication relationship (Bowers, 2001). The third is because of data from PRO, VoiceP,
and nominalisations that shows the requirement of a VoiceP for a SOD to be acceptable, which I
now discuss.
23 We can see that this can be paraphrased as “When in Melbourne, John lives in a CBD apartment.”
24 Winkler (1997) and Ike-Uchi (1990) adopt a similar view based on Larsonian VP shells (Larson, 1988a, 1988b).
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As noted previously, implicit objects and implicit agents of passives cannot serve as hosts for
secondary predicates. Given the acceptability of the below sentences, secondary predicates are
used standardly as an argument for a syntactically represented PRO (Landau, 2013):
(65) a. The meat was too chewy [PRO to be eaten raw]
b. [PRO to serve dinner angry at the guests] is bad manners
Safir (1987) notes that depictives are acceptable when predicated of the subject of a nominalisa-
tion.
(66) [PRO discussion of these issues stoned] rarely produces satisfactory results
Nominalisations can be separated into two types. Argument Structure nominals (AS-nominals)
and Referential nominals (R-nominals) (Borer, 2013).25 AS-nominals and R-nominals differ in
whether they contain VoiceP. Since R-nominals lack VoiceP, they cannot serve as a host for SODs,
while AS-nominals can, since they have VoiceP:
(67) a. [PRO discussing these issues drunk] is a bad idea
b. [PRO the discussion of these issues drunk] is a bad idea [AS-nominal]
c. * [PRO the discussion drunk] is a bad idea [R-nominal]
This can be further seen in the way that depictives disambiguate between AS-nominals and R-
nominals:
(68) Maria’s reading of Pride and Prejudice received better reviews than Anna’s (Kratzer, 1996)
The sentence in (68) is ambiguous between an AS-nominal and a R-nominal, and so has two
readings—one in which Maria and Anna are agents, and another in which they are not. On the
AS-nominal reading, Maria and Anna are those who gave readings of Pride and Prejudice. On the
R-nominal reading, Maria and Anna attended different, separate readings of Pride and Prejudice,
and aren’t the ones who gave the reading. Since depictives are only acceptable with AS-nominals,
when added to a nominalization that is ambiguous between an AS-nominal and a R-nominal, it
disambiguates the sentence by forcing an AS-nominal interpretation:
(69) Maria’s reading of Pride and Prejudice drunk received better reviews than Anna’s sober
In (69), Maria and Anna must be agents, and a reading where they attended separate readings
that they did not give is unavailable. If SODs were generated inside the VP, then these facts would
be mysterious and unexplained, since there is apparently no difference in the VP between these
sentences. A possible counter-view of this is that SODs purely need an Agent theta role. However,
unaccusatives, which lack an Agent role, are acceptable,26 whereas by-phrases, which introduce an
25 Grimshaw (1990) gives a three-way split, but I follow Borer in distinguishing only between those that support
argument structure and those that do not.
26 Tests indicate that these are SODs, and not OODs:
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agent, are not acceptable hosts:27
(70) The shipi sank emptyi
(71) *The ship was sunk by the captaini drunki
As such, I conclude that SODs are VoiceP adjuncts, and so are generated outside the bare VP, but
within the extended VP.
2.3.1 A small clause analysis of secondary predication
I now discuss the internal structure of the depictive itself. There are two main approaches to
depictives. A small clause/control analysis, and a complex predicate analysis.28 Small clause
analyses29 have the depictive as a small clause predicate, with a PRO subject which is controlled
by a DP in the main clause. The depictive then establishes an indirect link with the controller of
its subject PRO. The level at which the secondary predicate is joined determines what its syntactic
controller can be, and therefore its interpretation.
Complex predicate approaches instead have the depictive combine directly with the verb, forming
a complex predicate. As such, contrary to the small clause approach, a predication relationship is
directly established between the depictive and its subject, instead of an intermediate one through
control, as the verb and depictive become a complex predicate and so form a predicative relationship
together with the subject.
I choose a small clause approach over a complex predicate analysis for a number of reasons. The
small clause has the benefit of uniting main clause predication and secondary predication, as the
VoiceP introduces the external argument as well as the secondary predicate. Further, as we will
see in later chapters, the semantics and function of this operation, and the head of the VoiceP
projection, are crucial to my analysis of secondary predication.
There are also independent issues with complex predicate analyses. For example, on complex
predicate analyses, OODs and resultatives are syntactically non-distinct (e.g. Cormack and Smith,
1999; Rothstein, 2003, 2004). But tests reveal that OODs and resultatives differ in what they
accept:
(i) a. The shipi sank emptyi and the boatj did so fullj
b. *What sank was the ship empty
c. (i) The ship sank off the coast empty
(ii) The ship sank empty off the coast
27 However, this is marginally acceptable if a heavy pause is inserted between drunk and the rest of the sentence,
but in this case it is not a depictive.
28 Complex predicate analyses can be further separated into two types– lexical approaches (Wunderlich, 1997) or
syntactic operations (Bach, 1980; Rothstein, 2001, 2004). See also Cormack and Smith (1999), Geuder (2000),
Irimia (2012).
29 Among others: Williams (1980), Chomsky (1981), Rothstein (1983), Hoekstra (1988), Roberts (1988), Dechaine
(1993), Bowers (2001)
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(72) a. John met Maryi [whistling La Internationale]i
b. *John cooked the meat disgusting
While OODs can be verbal participles with -ing,30 resultatives cannot be.
This would be difficult to explain if OODs and resultatives are syntactically non-distinct. Second,
as we will see in the next section, the depictive predicate can have different properties from the
main event, such as in how long the depictive holds of the entity it is predicated of. Again,
this is difficult to explain if the depictive predicate and main predicate form a complex predicate.
Following Bowers (2001), I argue that SODs are adjoined at VoiceP, and OODs are adjoined within
the VP.31.
2.4 Semantic properties of depictives
There is a lot of controversy over the semantic properties of depictives, with many proposed
properties being contested in the literature. In this section, I look at a few of the major semantic
properties of depictives, and discuss the evidence for them. As we will see, there are certainly a
cluster of key properties of depictives, but they don’t always appear to be necessary, and are often
a matter of (strong) preference rather than a restriction.
Depictives generally hold of a participant at a given time, and the depictive must share a thematic
role with the matrix verb (Williams, 1980; Rothstein, 1983). For example:
(73) *John drove Maryi drunki
Specifically, this can’t merely mean John drove while Mary was drunk; there needs to be a rela-
tionship between John’s driving and Mary’s drunkenness. For example, the reading where John
drives Mary in a car, and Mary is drunk is fine.
2.4.1 Depictives as temporary properties
Though many properties are disputed, “it is generally agreed that in English, depictive predicates
must denote non-inherent and transistory properties.” (Rothstein, 2011, p. 1444). This is based
on the observation that depictives that have more permanent properties are judged unacceptable
compared to those with temporary properties. Rothstein (1983) gives the following contrasts in
acceptability to motivate this view:32
30 Though, as noted previously, Rothstein (2004) denies that there are VP depictives due to the way that she treats
event summing.
31 Bowers specifies V′ for OODs, but the exact position of the OOD will depend on what analysis of the VP is
adopted. See chapter 5 for a brief discussion of this that involves an extended VP analysis.
32 I use the star here as this is what Rothstein reports, however, these sentences are not always unacceptable to
speakers, and are often improved if given proper context. For example, if told in the context of the historical change
of the colour of carrots from purple to orange, then We eat carrots orange can make sense. The important point
in this case is that the context then shifts the property to be a less permanent one, or provides an appropriate
contextual boundary or bound for the property. In my judgement, I would mark these ?? if uttered ‘out of the
blue’.
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(74) a. John ate the peanutsi saltedi/*saltyi
b. John ate the meati rawi/burnti/*tastyi
c. I met Maryi drunki/in high spiritsi/*talli/*stupidi
d. We eat carrots rawi/*orange
Salted and salty are more or less the same in the property they ascribe to the peanuts, but salty is
usually interpreted as being a permanent, inherent property, as compared to salted. This contrast
can be seen in other examples in which a temporary property serves fine as a depictive, but a more
permanent one is unacceptable.
(75) a. John drove home drunk
b. #John drove home intelligent
This particular observation has been phrased in many differents ways by researchers: Bolinger
(1971) mentions needing a temporary state; Dowty (1972) phrases it as depictives being a ‘tempo-
rally restricted state’; Randall (1982) says that it has to be ‘escapable from’; Ogawa (2001) states
that it must be a ‘relational predicate’; and Wyngaerd (2001) argues for ‘boundedness’. All of these
revolve around the insight that the property denoted by a depictive has a temporary interpretation,
or otherwise picks out a particular point in time.
The most common way of framing this restriction is by using the distinction between Stage-Level
and Individual-Level Predicates (Carlson, 1977). The SLP/ILP divide stems from work by Mil-
sark (1974) – who used the terms state-descriptive and property predicates – and Carlson (1977),
who introduced the Stage-Level/Individual-Level terminology. The distinction is based on the ob-
servation that predicates can differ in what they express – such as being properties of stages, or
properties of individuals:33
“A stage is conceived of as being, roughly, a spatially and temporally bounded manifes-
tation of something [...] An individual, then, is (at least) that whatever-it-is that ties
a series of stages together to make them stages of the same thing.”
(Carlson, 1977, p. 68)
Many researchers have claimed that only SLPs are suitable for use in depictives.34 However, there
are examples of what appear to be ILPs serving as depictives:
(76) a. Poe died a pauper
b. They left the Army feverent noninterventionists
33 Carlson (1977) also divides individuals up further into objects and kinds, but this will not be relevant for the
discussion here.
34 This is a widely repeated and oft-cited claim. As a small sample: Rothstein, 1983; Stump, 1985; McNulty, 1988;
Tsuzuki, 1988; Jackendoff, 1990; Rapoport, 1991, 1993a; Miyamoto, 1994; Maruta, 1995; N. Koizumi, 1996; Winkler,
1997; Himmelmann and Schultze-Berndt, 2005; Simpson, 2005; Maienborn, 2011.
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c. My dad was born compulsive and will die compulsive
d. The tablecloth went to the cleaners white and came back yellowish
(Examples from McNally, 1994)
A natural rejoinder to examples like (76) is that the ILPs are coerced into SLPs by being in a
depictive context.35 This predicts that when ILPs are put into depictive constructions, they are
either judged unacceptable, or receive a ‘temporary’ interpretation—such as giving a sense that
the property is temporary, or is an implicit comparison to another state of affairs. But several
authors have argued against this (Condoravdi, 1992; McNally, 1994; Filip, 2001).
McNally (1994)36 argues against a coercion account based on two points. First, the properties
expressed by the depictives in (76) are not required to be transistory properties in order to be true.
Second, depictives with ILPs “yield a conversational implicature that the event expressed by the
main predicate marks a contextually significant boundary just after the believed beginning or just
before the believed end of the interval during which the adjunct predication holds” (McNally, 1994,
p. 5). She points out that depictives with SLPs don’t trigger this implicature, but ILPs do have –
in terms of Condoravdi (1992) – an ‘inference of temporal persistence’:37
Individual-level predicates are associated with an inference of temporal persistence,
stage-level predicates are not. The inference of temporal persistence in effect specifies
the following: if an eventuality is going on at time t and you have no information that
it is not going on at some later time t ′, then infer that it is going on at that later time
t ′ as well. Note that this is a default inference, surfacing only if there is no information
to the contrary
(Condoravdi, 1992, p. 9)
Previous researchers have suggested there must be a pragmatic compatability (e.g. McNally, 1994;
Aarts, 1995) or that there is a particular semantic link between the verb and the depictive that
must be met (e.g. Demonte, 1987). For example, McNally notes that there is a simultaneity
condition, so that the property denoted by the secondary predicate has to hold at the same time
as the event denoted by the main verb. According to her account, if the condition is trivially met
(e.g. such as in an ILP which is generally thought to hold of the subject at all times), then the
sentence is unacceptable.38 This has the benefit of explaining why appropriate context can improve
the acceptability of depictive constructions—when a proper situation is established in which the
condition is met non-trivially, then the sentence can be interpreted.
In terms of McNally’s analysis, a context that allows the simultaneity condition to be non-trivially
35 Another issue is that the SLP/ILP distinction has been increasingly challenged in recent years, with some
researchers arguing that it is an aggregrate of several differences (e.g. Higginbotham and Ramchand, 1997; Fernald,
2000; Jäger, 1999, 2001), or that it is better explained by reference to another distinction (e.g. Wyngaerd, 2001;
Husband, 2012). I return to discuss the SLP/ILP distinction in more depth in chapter 4.
36 McNally uses circumstantial to refer to SODs, and depictives to refer to OODs. I do not follow this terminology.
37 But, as Carlson (1977, p. 72) notes, be dead is a SLP, so sense of permanence is a weak notion for ILPs.
38 Rothstein (1983) has a similar account in that the depictive must simultaneously be an intrinsic and transitory
property of its subject.
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met improves the acceptability of the sentence. This can be extended to explain why there is a
tendency to interpret depictives as being temporary states. This analysis also predicts that this
infelicity could be exploited for conversational effect. Consider McNally’s example of:
(77) Joe went in to the exam unprepared, he went in to the exam tired, he went in to the exam
without a calculator. But he didn’t go into the exam stupid. And so it turned out that he
got the highest grade in the class, despite himself.
(Example from McNally, 1994, p. 11)
As McNally notes, there is no implication that John has changed from being stupid, or that he
will soon become stupid. If ILPs were being coerced into SLPs, then we would not expect the
inference to continue. This presents an issue which coercion accounts must explain. But although
the theoretical components are under heavy debate, the observation that depictives prefer to be
interpreted as temporary predicates is a robust one, and a theory of depictives needs to be able to
capture this.
2.4.2 Depictives and cotemporality
Another key property is that there is a strong link between the temporal components of the
matrix verb and the secondary predicate, with the event of the matrix verb and the property of
the secondary predicate temporally overlapping. As noted previously, depictives are participant-
oriented, rather than event-oriented—they attribute a quality to the subject of the depictive at the
time of the event denoted by the verb of the main clause it is attached to. Importantly, depictives
appear to introduce their own eventuality, which composes with the main event. It is clear that,
minimally, the property of the depictive holds of the subject during the same time as the matrix
event (and it may be pragmatically interpreted to extend beyond this given appropriate context).
On event summing approaches like Rothstein (2004), the runtime of the depictive property is set
by the runtime of the matrix event.
(78) a. He drove the car drunk
b. He drove the car to the store drunk
In (78a), the property drunk holds of the subject during the event of his driving. When the runtime
of the matrix event is changed (78b), this changes how long the property holds of the subject. This
interpretation is robust, with a general inability to state that the subject wasn’t drunk for the
entire event:
(79) He drove the car drunk... #but he was sober by the end
However, some speakers do appear to accept sentences where the property is cancelled before the
entirety of the event runtime:39
39 Arguably this is due to an ambiguity in the main verb. as to whether e.g. took the tram home is referring to the
action of undertaking the event, or the entire event itself. Compare:
(80) He took the tram home drunk... but got off half-way and sobered up before arriving home
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(81) a. He drove the car to the store drunk... %but he sobered up on the way there
b. He took the tram home drunk... %but he sobered up before he got home
This suggests that the view that the depictive’s runtime is set by the matrix event’s runtime is not
wholly correct. Further evidence for this comes from the fact that we can see that how long the
property holds for can actually vary:
(82) a. Johni painted the house tiredi
b. Johni reached the summit exhaustedi
c. They dissected the animali alivei
In (82a), the depictive tired holds of the participant (John) for the entirety of the event. Compare
this to (82b), for which the only requirement is that the participant be tired by the beginning of
the achievement, i.e. the point at which the summit is reached. A final example is (82c), in which
it cannot be the case that the secondary predicate holds for the entirety of the main event, as
they clash—dissection entails death, and so an animal cannot be alive during the full process of
dissection. Double object constructions similarly show a variance in how long the depictive holds
of the matrix event:40
(83) a. I threw/sent him the ball wet, but when he got it it was dry
b. When it left my hand/me it was wet, #but I threw/sent him the ball dry
For complex predicates which have a cause and a result event, the depictive only modifies the
former:
(84) a. He flattened the metal wet, but by the time it was completely flat it had dried
b. He always shears the sheep asleep, although they usually wake up before they are com-
pletely shorn
c. People usually cook lobsters alive (by the time they achieve cooked state, they are
dead)
As such, more properly stated, the property of the depictive only holds of the causing event, though
it can be extended further to cover the entirety of the event depending on type and use.
2.4.3 Aspectual restrictions on OODs
Depictives differ in some restrictions depending on their orientation, with OODs being more re-
stricted than SODs. OODs appear to have more stringent restrictions on the aspectual types of
events that they can compose with.
40 The following examples are from Bruening (2015).
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(85) Accomplishments
a. We ate the meati rawi/cookedi
b. John served the soupi coldi/hoti
c. Mary climbed the walli weti/dryi
(86) Achievements
a. ??John reached the summiti icyi
b. ??John recognised Maryi drunki
c. ??John won the boxi brokeni
(87) Activities
a. ??John pushed Maryi drunki
b. ??John chased Maryi drunki
c. ??Mary juggled the ballsi dryi
(88) Semelfactives
a. ??John knocked Maryi drunki
b. ??John blinked his eyesi bloodshoti
c. ??The emu flapped its wingsi injuredi
Based on data like this, it has been claimed that depictives can only be depicted of objects inside
telic and durative VPs (Richardson, 2007; Motut, 2010; Irimia, 2012), i.e. accomplishments. There
have been a number of different explanations for this apparent ban. For example, Rapoport
(1993b, 1999) uses the Aspectual Structure framework of Erteschik-Shir and Rapoport (1997)
to give an account of depictives. She argues that the “host of a depictive predicate must be a
subject in AS structure.” (Rapoport, 1999, p. 662). This goes towards explaining the apparent
difference in restriction between SODs and OODs, as in this framework, only accomplishment
objects are underlyingly subjects, whereas activity and achievement objects are not. This predicts
that all objects of activity and achievement verbs cannot serve as depictive hosts.41 However,
depictives predicated of objects of activities and achievements are attested. Likewise, OODs with
semelfactives are also found:
41 Some authors (e.g. Richardson, 2007) suggest push might be a semelfactive and so is ruled out on those grounds.
I return to this below.
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(89) a. I recognised[ACH] himi deadi better than I had recognised himi alivei
(Google)
b. Between lessons (once a week) the guitar lost its tune and my sister played[ACT ] the
guitari untunedi because she didn’t know how to tune it.
(Google)
c. She made no sounds as her feet hit[SEM ] the groundi [wet from dew and rain]i
(Google)
If only objects of durative, telic VPs were able to serve as hosts for depictives, then we would
expect the examples in (89) to be unacceptable. However, since this is not the case, this raises
the question of where the difference in acceptability arises from—why are some sentences involving
nondurative or atelic VPs unacceptable while others aren’t? Obviously there cannot be a wholesale
ban on OODs with regards to verb class, and so the restriction must be finer-grained.
Taking OODs with activity verbs as being representative of this issue, explanations for this differ-
ence in acceptability have varied, with many revolving around the thematic role involved in the
depictive. But these often have counter-examples, and so fail to capture the data. For example,
it is argued that the depictive cannot be predicated of a non-affected-theme object (Williams,
1980; Rothstein, 1983; M. Koizumi, 1994). This is used to explain the unacceptablity of sentences
like:
(90) a. *John hit Tomi nakedi
b. *Mary praised the professori drunki
(Example from M. Koizumi, 1994, p. 64)
But Richardson (2007) provides counter-examples, and argues that such depictives are acceptable
if there’s no ‘semantic mismatch’ between the primary and secondary predicate:
(91) The photographer praised the modeli nakedi (Richardson, 2007, p. 122)
Similar approaches have stated that only a certain subset of thematic roles can be predicated of.
Williams (1980) argues that OODs can only be predicated of themes. However, McNulty (1988)
provides the following counter-examples:
(92) a. I marinated the meati rawi
b. I sanded the floori weti
c. Mary destroyed the noveli unfinishedi
(Example from McNulty, 1988, p. 208)
McNulty argues that these are depictives predicated of patients, which contradicts Williams’ re-
striction. McNulty (1988, p. 211) puts forth her own generalisation that depictives can only be
predicated of themes, agents, and patients, with patients only being acceptable if there are no
themes in the structure. This, however, also appears to be inadequate:
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(93) a. *John patted the meati rawi
b. John marinated the meati rawi
Under McNulty’s analysis – assuming the meat is a patient in both – (93b) would have to contain
a theme while (93a) doesn’t, but there does not seem to be a good reason to expect that this is
true. On a similar track, Rothstein (1983) suggests that depictives cannot be predicated of goals,
however, Jackendoff (1990, p. 203) demonstrates that this does not capture the empirical data
either.
(94) a. Johni received the letter drunki
b. Bill buttered the breadi warmi
I argue that the issue here is the basing of the restriction in terms of the thematic role that the
depictive is predicated of, which cannot be maintained. Instead, there is a more complex interaction
involving the parts of the event and their interaction across the nominal and adjectival domain. In
a similar vein, Motut (2014) has argued that what is relevant is whether the secondary predicate
can be mapped to every subpart of the situation.
There is a (sub)part of the object (or possibly the entire object) being Q-ed (where
Q is the primary predicate), in every sub-event/situation of the larger event/situation
denoted by the primary predicate.
(Motut, 2014, p. 245)
I believe that this sort of analysis is on the right track, however, it is not exactly clear how Motut’s
account would explain the difference between the adjectives loaded and broken, which both appear
to be a mappable property to every subpart of the situation:42
(95) a. ??John pushed the carti brokeni
b. John pushed the carti loadedi
I take this minimal pair to demonstrate that what is relevant is not just the type of object and the
verb class, but also the type of adjective that is used and its relationship to the matrix event. The
differences in acceptability with different verb classes shows that there are aspectual interactions
between the depictive, its controller, and the matrix event.
2.5 Aim of analysis
For a satisfactory account of depictives it is necessary to integrate an account of their properties
with an explanation of their restrictions. The goal of my analysis is to successfully capture and
explain this variability with depictives, especially with regards to OODs. As seen in this chapter,
42 Likewise, Motut (2014, p. 246) notes that her account rules out OOD goals, but this conflicts with the data
presented by Jackendoff (1990) as discussed above.
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there are a number of interesting properties of depictives. For this thesis, I consider two questions
in particular that have been raised in the literature.43
1. What determines the restriction on verb classes for OODs?
2. Why are depictives interpreted as being temporary states?
In order to ground a suitable theory of depictives, we need to be able to answer these questions. As
we’ve seen in this chapter, there many incorrect generalisations about the depictive construction
that still proliferate the literature, leading to an unsatisifactory analysis of depictives. In the next
chapter, I focus on the first question: the restriction on verbs classes for OODs. By concentrating
on adjectival OODs, I will show how differences in formal features of adjectives can affect the
acceptability of OODs with activity verbs, and what this can ultimately tell us about the depictive
construction.
43 Another important question, though not one explored in this thesis, is whether depictives and resultatives are
instantiations of the same predicative relationship. For example, Williams (1980), Rothstein (1983), Simpson (1983),
Bowers (1993) hold that depictives and resultatives both stem from the same secondary predication operation, while
Dowty (1979) argues that resultatives are complex verb formations, and depictives are adjunct predicates.
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Chapter 3
Depictives and adjective scales
In this chapter, I focus on adjectival OODs and their restrictions. As we saw in the last chapter,
OODs show restrictions based on the verb class they’re composing with—while OODs predicated
of objects of accomplishment verbs are generally fine, OODs predicated of objects of activity
verbs are much rarer. I will look at various accounts that have been offered to capture this
descriptively, and evaluate their success. Any theory of depictives that bans OODs with activity
verbs is obviously insufficient, but it has proven difficult to correctly characterise which OODs
are acceptable without over- or under-generating. There have been a wide array of suggested
explanations for this restriction by verb class, but I will show that most have been unsuccessful.
The aim of this chapter is to look at what can capture the difference between a pair of sentences
like (95):
(1) a. John pushed the carti loadedi
b. ??John pushed the carti brokeni
This pair suggests that a property of the adjective interacts with the depictive to condition accept-
ability. Given the apparent interaction of adjective properties with the depictive construction, it
is useful to look at what distinctions can be made within the class of adjectives, and how these
might capture this variance. A particularly important property of adjectives is their gradability,
which is dependent on adjective scales. By using the variable acceptability of gradable adjectives
as OODs, I will propose my own analysis of the verb class restriction based on adjective scales.
I will show has greater empirical coverage as well as successfully predicting previously unnoticed
behaviour.
Defining the semantic category of adjectives is difficult, but perhaps most simply they can be
thought of as modifiers that denote properties or qualities that an object has. An interesting
factor is that some objects can differ in how much of a property they have, while other objects
either have the property or not. We can see this difference by asking how much an object has of a
property.
(2) a. How tall is this house?
b. ??How prime is this number?
While (2a) is a perfectly reasonable question, (2b) is nonsensical. It doesn’t make sense to ask how
prime a number is, since numbers cannot differ in their (amount of) ‘primeness’. However, it is
also odd to suggest that a given object has ‘tallness’. More correctly, we would say that a given
object is tall if the object has a height that meets or exceeds the standard that we’re designating
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as being tall. This reveals two key facts about adjectives: they can vary in how much of a property
they denote an object has, and that there are standards by which we judge whether an object has
that property or not. Adjectives that can vary in their amount are called gradable, while adjectives
that are categorical (i.e. they either have the property or not) are called non-gradable.1 Whether
an adjective is gradable or not affects which context it can appear in:
(3) a. i) A very tall woman
ii) #A very prime number
b. (i) The taller woman
(ii) #The primer number
c. The boy is six feet tall
Gradable adjectives can take a degree modifier like very, can be used in comparative constructions,
and can appear with a measure phrase. Conversely, non-gradable adjectives cannot. This follows
as a consequence of being non-gradable, as that means the property is categorical, and so it doesn’t
make sense to say something is e.g. very prime if something cannot differ in how much something
has that property. Similarly, it’s not possible to compare two items in how much they have of a
property if there’s no ability for that property to differ in its amount.
The sentence in (3bi) obviously requires a comparison to another woman with regards to height,
and so can only be uttered in a context which supplies that. So we might say that context provides
the suitable objects for comparison. But what about a very tall woman in (3ai)? It seemingly
does not require any other woman to be in the domain of discourse—we could imagine a scenario
in which there is only one person left, and the sentence would still be seen as felicitous. And yet
it still seems to be compared to something, since even though there may only be one person left,
the judgement of their tallness depends on what we know about height, and what counts as tall
for women. In this case, we say that there is a comparison to a standard.
Standards can be conceptualised in a few different ways, but essentially they are what is compared
to in order to determine whether something meets having that property or not. To determine
whether something is tall requires comparing the relative property to what is the standard de-
cided for tallness. These standards can differ, and so gradable adjectives can be further divided
into absolute and relative.2 Relative adjectives have context-dependent interpretations, and what
counts as fitting that property will depend on the situation and the relevant facts under discus-
sion. Conversely, absolute adjectives are relatively context-independent, and their standards are
set independently.
To see this, consider again the adjective tall, which is a relative adjective. The standards for what
is considered tall don’t always appear to be the same. For example, while we might say that Mary
1 Gradable adjectives can further be subdivided into dimensional and evaluative, following Bierwisch, 1989. This
is related to the property of scales (discussed below), but is likely a separate factor as well (see Morzycki, 2015,
133ff for discussion). Also relevant to the class of gradable adjectives are adjectival participles or deverbal adjectives,
depending on the verb class that they are derived from (Demonte, 2011, p. 1316).
2 The terms appear to originate with Unger (1971, 1975). The exposition I present here is based on the accounts
developed in Kennedy and McNally (2005) and Kennedy (2007).
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is a tall jockey, this doesn’t necessarily license the fact that Mary is tall, only that she is tall
relative to other jockeys. As proof of this, imagine a situation in which we can change the class
of jockeys. If jockeys have a height that is relatively close to, or exceed Mary’s height, then the
statement that Mary is a tall jockey would be judged false. Conversely, if we consider the scenario
in which (other) jockeys only have a height that is substantively less than Mary, the statement is
judged true. Further, we could imagine a case where Mary is also independently tall by general
standards, in which case tall jockey could be interpreted as being tall and a jockey, rather than
being tall for a jockey.
Compare this to full, which is an absolute adjective. To be full is not something that can easily
contextually vary, since there is a clear notion of what something needs to be in order to be classified
as full, i.e. having no room left for the object in question. Two objects that are considered full
are going to be full in a manner that is more context-independent than what is considered tall.
This difference in context-dependence can also be seen with the distribution of for -PPs. For -PPs
specify further information about a context, and are acceptable with relative adjectives, but less
so with absolute adjectives.3
(4) a. (i) Mary is tall/short for a jockey
(ii) That desk is wide for a study desk
b. (i) ??Mary is awake for a jockey
(ii) ??That desk is wet for a study desk
This follows from the context-dependence of relative adjectives; since absolute adjectives are
context-independent, these same for -PPs result in oddness.4 We can see that this cannot result
from being non-gradable, as all these examples are gradable adjectives:
(5) a. Mary is taller/more awake than John
b. This desk is wider/wetter than that desk
Aarts (1992, p. 63) states that adjectives in depictive constructions tend to be non-gradable, and
demonstrates this by showing how the addition of gradable modifiers like very, utterly, or extremely
results in unacceptability.5
(6) a. He painted the house (??very) unsandedi
b. He met the Directori (??utterly) drunki
c. He ate the nutsi (??extremely) saltedi
3 These examples sentences can be made interpretable, but only if supplied with a specific context, which in effect
gives a context-dependent reading of the adjective.
4 However, there are issues of context-sensitivity, and other accounts of the absolute/relative split highlight this
(Cruse, 1986; Rotstein & Winter, 2004; McNally, 2009; Lassiter, 2010); even though absolute adjectives have well-
defined end points, this does not mean that they’re completely context-independent. I return to this point later.
5 Aarts marks the addition of very with *, but I use ?? here for reasons discussed in the introduction.
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However, broken and loaded in (1) are both gradable, and yet vary in acceptability. As such, this
raises the question of how adjectives function with depictives. As (6) shows, the gradable status
of adjectives affects acceptability. This gives a starting point for investigation, and so I will first
look at gradability in adjectives generally, and then the possible divisions that can be made in
adjectives structure and meaning. I will then apply these to investigating gradability in adjectival
depictives specifically, and show how gradability can reveal further facts about the requirements
of depictives.
3.1 Scales, degrees, and standards
Traditionally, the semantics of properties has treated individuals in a domain as either being in
the set of things that have that property (the extension) or not (the anti-extension).6 As discussed
previously, items can vary in how much they have a property, and so this requires a semantics of
scales, that are ordered and gradable. While a split between the extension and anti-extension is
adequate if the individuals of the sets are clearly delineated, this breaks down in cases of vagueness.
For the sentence John is tall, it is unclear whether John is in the set of tall things or not without
further information about what we consider to be tall. In this way, tall is vague, but importantly,
we can eliminate this vagueness by specifying further information; for -PPs can give an explicit
comparison class, which specifies the standard to which the individual is being compared to.
(7) John is tall for a jockey
While there may be a question of whether John is tall in general, there is a more precise notion of
whether John is tall for a jockey. We then need a theory that can capture vagueness, and how we
can have more and less vague predicates. At its base, a gradable adjective is being compared to
some measure of that property. This raises the question of what exactly is being compared, and
how we should capture that in our theory of semantics. Here, it is useful to introduce the concept
of scales. Informally, a scale is an ordering against a given dimension. So, in the case of tall, its
scale is the ordering of things against the dimension of height. We can say that what an object is
being compared to is a scale of the possible amounts of the property in question. Two objects are
compared in their ordering on that scale, so that something is e.g. taller than another thing if the
first object is higher on the scale, or shorter than another thing if the first object is lower on the
scale.
3.1.1 Scales and endpoints
Scales can differ in whether they have endpoints or not. Take straight and bent. They are both
points on a scale of straightness—we can conceptualise straightness as an ordering of possible
amounts of bend, with straight being the point of zero bend, and bent being any non-zero bend,
i.e. if we reduce the amount of bend in an object, there will be a point at which what we classify
as straightness is reached. This will be a maximal point that caps the end of the scale, since if
something is straight, it generally does not make sense to ask if it can be made straighter.7
6 Also called the positive and negative extension.
7 We can use comparatives to compare straightness, but importantly, this does not entail something is straight:
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(8) This rod is straight... ??but it could be straighter
For something to be bent, there must be a minimal amount of bend that the object must have,
which is anything below the maximal point of straightness. But there is no maximal amount of
bend, and so it perfectly sensible to say something could be made more bent.
(9) This rod is bent... but it could be more bent
Straight and bent differ in how they relate to a scale endpoint. Straight is a maximum standard
adjective, as it has a maximal point that closes the scale, while bent is a minimum standard
adjective, and that same point is the minimal amount of bend that an object needs to have to be
considered bent. More generally, maximum standard adjectives have a maximal degree or maximal
element for what counts as having that property. This degree or element is a limiting endpoint
on ‘how much’ of a property an entity can have, or must meet in order to have that property.
Minimum standard adjectives, on the other hand, have a minimal degree or minimal element that
must be met in order to count as having that property.
The examples that we have used so far, such as (tall/short and straight/bent), are all antonymous
pairs of adjectives. Importantly, pairs of antonyms use the same scale, but are reversed in how
they treat that scale. This has implications for standards, and depends on the structure of the
scale used. We can compare the pair of relative adjectives tall/short to straight and its antonym
bent (which are both absolute) to illustrate this point. Tall and short are antonyms, and so both
use the same scale. What is tall for one context may be considered short for another, and so tall
and short have no general interpretation by themselves, and must be set in a context. Contrast
this with straight and bent, which have a much clearer and more general interpretation.
We can now formulate the absolute/relative distinction in terms of the difference in scale structure;
any scale that has at least one closed element is absolute, while scales that lack these elements are
relative. Whether a scale has a maximal or minimal element has implications for its interpretation
and modifiers which it can appear with.8
(i) This rod is straighter than that rod ⇏ The rods are straight
8 The terms total and partial are also used for maximal and minimal endpoint adjectives respectively (Yoon, 1996;










Figure 3.1: Absolute/Relative adjectives and Maximal/Minimal elements
To decide the properties of the scale that adjectives are on, we need to look at adjective polar-
ity.
3.1.2 Adjective polarity
Antonymous pairs reveal a special fact about adjectives; adjectives have a positive and a negative
form.9 This is also called the polarity of the adjective. Often negative forms of the adjective
are distinguished from their positive antonym with overt negative morphology, like e.g. possi-
ble/impossible, and pure/impure.10 However, often adjective pairs don’t immediately show which
form is which, like e.g. tall/short and wide/narrow. To distinguish them, we can use a number
of different tests; an adjective can appear in different contexts depending on whether it is the
positive or negative form of an antonym pair. For example, the negative form does not appear
with measure phrases, nor does it occur in nominalisations that also have the dimension that they
measure.11
(10) a. (i) Two metres tall/??short
(ii) Two metres wide/??narrow
b. (i) 50 years old
(ii) ??50 years young
(11) a. The length/width of the box is one metre
b. #The shortness/narrowness of the box is one metre
Negative adjectives also resist being used in comparatives with twice as.
9 Alternatively, known as unmarked and marked respectively. Unfortunately both sets of terminology are also
used to refer to other attributes in the literature.
10 However, having negative morphology does not guarantee that the adjective is the negative member of the pole.
For instance, damaged and undamaged.
11 However, not all positive forms accept measure phrases. Compare tall to fast : #100 kilometres fast/100
kilometres slow.
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(12) a. This plank is twice as long as that plank
b. #This plank is twice as short as that plank
The negative adjective also differs from the positive adjective in whether it carries a presupposition
or entailment when used in wh-questions or equative constructions.
(13) a. (i) How tall are you? ⇏ You are tall
(ii) John is as tall as Mary ⇏ John and Mary are tall
b. (i) How short are you? ⇒ You are short
(ii) John is as short as Mary ⇒ John and Mary are short
The negative adjective short in the comparative construction results in the implication that the
relevant object(s) under discussion are short, whereas the positive adjective tall does not imply this.
Likewise, a similar presupposition arises for the use in wh-questions, where the negative adjective
implies that the object being questioned has that property, which does not arise for the use of the
positive adjective.
Polarity has an important relationship to scale structure, and the polarity of an adjective will
affect how it relates to its underlying scale. As stated before, the antonym of an adjective will
use the same scale structure. As we’ve linked the absolute/relative divide to scale structure, then
a relative adjective’s antonym will be relative, and similarly so for absolute adjectives and their
antonyms. Further, for closed scale adjectives, the endpoint for an adjective will correspond to
the opposite endpoint for its antonym. So, if a positive adjective has a maximal degree, then this
will be the minimal degree for its negative pair/antonym. Conversely, if a positive adjective has
a minimal degree, then this will be its antonym’s maximal degree. Since this does not apply to
relative adjectives, it has implications for how relative adjective antonyms are treated.
For example, something that is not tall need not necessarily be short, and vice versa, since relative
adjectives lack an endpoint. For absolute adjectives – which have at least one endpoint – then
the negation of one of the adjective pair will entail the other. However, this will depend on
whether there is a maximal or minimal degree, or both. As an example, compare full/empty to
straight/bent. Full and empty are closed on both ends. As such, if something is maximally full,
then it is minimally empty (i.e. not empty at all). On the contrary, if something is maximally
empty, then it is minimally full (i.e. not full at all). This is because the endpoints on the scale that
decide the maximal or minimal point for this adjective pair don’t just meet, they are the same; the
minimal amount of emptiness is the maximal amount of fullness, and vice versa.
At first this seems to be the same for straight and bent ; something that is bent is not straight, and
something that is straight is not bent. However, while it is fine to talk about both a maximal and
minimal degree for fullness and emptiness, it doesn’t make sense to talk about a maximal sense of
bend, or a minimal sense of straightness. Something is either straight or it isn’t, and we don’t talk
about two straight things differing in their straightness. Likewise, there’s no upper-limit on how
far something can be bent. If we compare this to a minimal sense of bend and a maximal sense
of straightness, we can see that these are perfectly coherent, and that these points are in fact the
39
same point on a scale. Given the difference in scales and their various endpoints, this leads us to
a consideration of the typology of possible scales.
3.1.3 Scale structures
Since adjectives can differ in whether they have maximal or minimal elements, that gives us four
logically possible combinations: totally-open (no such elements), upper-closed (only a maximal
element), lower-closed (only a minimal element), and totally-closed (both a maximal and a minimal
element).





Table 3.1: Typology of possible adjective scales
We can show this by using different types of degree modifiers. These modifiers react differently
depending on scale structure, which allows us to test what the scale structure of the adjective
is. There are maximality, minimality, and proportional modifiers, which test for upper-closed,
lower-closed, and totally-closed scales respectively.
Scale Type Test Example
Upper-closed Maximality 100%, fully, completely, totally, almost, absolutely...
Lower-closed Minimality Slightly, a bit...
Totally-closed Proportionality Half, mostly, quite...
Open Openness Very, utterly, extremely...
Table 3.2: Scale modifier types
As an example, we can use the modifiers slightly and almost, which test for minimal and maximal
elements in the scale structure of an adjective respectively (Rotstein & Winter, 2004; Kennedy
& McNally, 2005). Almost indicates that something is close to the point of satisfying the given
property. Conversely, slightly indicates that an object just meets the standard under discussion of
having a given property. Following our reasoning about scale structures, we would expect slightly
and almost to interact differently with bent and straight, due to the differences in the scales
of the adjectives; straight and bent are adjectives with (just) a maximal and minimal element
respectively.
(14) a. (i) This stick is slightly bent
(ii) ??This stick is almost bent
b. (i) This road is almost straight
(ii) ??This road is slightly straight
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Differences in entailment show whether the standard is on the upper or lower. This arises from
how the maximal and minimal elements are treated. When used with a maximal element adjec-
tive, partially entails that the object does not have that property. Whereas for minimal element
adjectives, the inference that the object has that property is licensed.
(15) a. The plant is partially dead ⇒ The plant is not dead
b. The bag is partially wet ⇒ The bag is wet
Some adjectives have both a maximal and minimal element in their scales, and so we would
predict that both modifiers are acceptable with them. As expected, open and closed, which have
both maximal and minimal elements, are acceptable with both slightly and almost.
(16) a. (i) This bag is slightly open
(ii) This bag is almost open
b. (i) This bag is slightly closed
(ii) This bag is almost closed
Antonyms have the opposite scale structure. For open and totally-closed scales, this means their
antonym is just on the same scale type. But for partially-closed scales, it means that the adjective
pairs have the opposite ends of their scales closed.
Open Totally-closed Upper-closed Lower-closed
tall/short open/closed dry wet
big/small empty/full straight bent
wide/narrow cooked/raw clean dirty
heavy/light visible/invisible safe dangerous
high/low transparent/opaque pure impure
Table 3.3: Antonyms and their scale types
For example, certain and uncertain are antonyms of each other. Certain is the positive adjective of
the pair, and is acceptable with maximality modifiers, but not with minimality modifiers, meaning
that it is on an upper-closed scale. As expected, uncertain shows the opposite distribution, as it
is the negative member of the pair, and is on the opposite scale.
(17) a. (i) I am absolutely certain
(ii) ??I am absolutely uncertain
b. (i) I am a bit uncertain
(ii) ??I am a bit certain
Conversely, a positive adjective like wet has the negative antonym dry. Wet has a minimal element
but not a maximal element, and so the scale that wet is on is lower-closed, which leads to wet
being acceptable with minimality modifiers but not with maximality modifiers. Its antonym dry,
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then, is acceptable with maximality modifiers, as it’s the negative pair to a positive adjective on a
lower-closed scale, and so the scale of dry is upper-closed.
(18) a. (i) The bag is slightly wet
(ii) ??The bag is almost wet
b. (i) ??The bag is slightly dry
(ii) The bag is almost dry
We can see further evidence for this account of modifiers in evidence from negation. Negation entails
the antonym of an adjective pair, and when used to negate one of the pair, leads to a flipped scale
structure. Consider the context in which a bag has been drying for a few hours.12
(19) a. (i) The bag is completely dry
(ii) ??The bag is completely not dry
b. (i) The bag is almost dry
(ii) ??The bag is almost not dry
(20) a. (i) The bag is completely wet
(ii) ??The bag is completely not wet
b. (i) The bag is almost wet
(ii) ??The bag is almost not wet
Totally-closed scales are special in that have both a maximal and minimal element. Because of this,
not only do they accept both maximality and minimality modifiers, but they also allow proportional
modifiers, like half, or mostly.
(21) a. The bag is half/mostly full
b. The pole is ??half/mostly bent
c. The boy is ??half/mostly tall
Since modifiers like half specify a point between a maximal and minimal element, scales that lack
either of these elements will not be defined. The degraded acceptability of constructions is explained
by the incompatibility of some modifiers with different types of scale structures, depending on the
maximal and minimal elements. These modifiers, then, provide a useful way of discovering what
scale structure an adjective pair has.
However this is not always straightforward, since some modifiers are ambiguous. For example,
pretty and completely, both have an intensificational use, and an endpoint use. In order to disam-
biguate these uses, it is necessary to look at entailment patterns. When pretty is used with a relative
adjective, it has an intensificational use, and doesn’t entail the property, but when used with an
absolute adjective, it entails that the object doesn’t have the property (Unger, 1975).13
12 This context eliminates the alternative readings of almost in which the bag almost became wet, but did not.
13 Unger assumes that on these cases that an implicit close or nearly is inserted into the semantic representation.
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(22) a. This stick is pretty long ⇒ This stick is long
b. This stick is pretty straight ⇏ This stick is straight
For completely, on the endpoint use, it is not possible to exceed this point without contradiction,
whereas the intensificational use allows this.
(23) a. The pole is completely straight... #but you could make it straighter
b. John is completely drunk... but Mary is even drunker
The potential ambiguity of adjectives and modifiers is important, and some modifiers will still be
acceptable with adjectives that we would expect them not to be. For instance, take wet.
(24) a. The bag is slightly wet
b. ??The bag is almost wet
c. The bag is half/mostly wet
Based on the difference in acceptability between (24a) and (24b) using slightly and almost, we would
classify wet as having a lower-closed scale. However, (24c) shows acceptability with proportional
modifiers, which should only be acceptable with a totally-closed scale. This can be for a few
different reasons. Acceptability can depend on the dimension that adjectives are targeting. For
instance, long can be measured by a temporal or a spatial dimension.14 Similarly, wet can refer
to the degree of saturation of a liquid that an object has, as well as a general use for moisture in
a given area. We can see this by using completely, which tests for maximal elements, and so is an
indication of a (upper-)closed scale.15 This shows the polysemy of wet, and how these meanings
differ in scale structure.
(25) a. (i) This is a wet bag
(ii) This is a wet country
b. (i) This is a completely wet bag
(ii) ??This is a completely wet country
Differences in how the property of the adjective applies to the object also shows another factor.
We can see this in that (24c) lacks an ambiguity that (24a) has. In the latter, slightly wet can
mean that either the bag has a general amount of moisture to be considered wet, or that part of
the bag is wet. In the former, only the part interpretation is available with half and mostly.
(26) a. This bag is slightly wet... but just the lower part/all over
b. This bag is half wet... but just the lower part/??all over
14 Adjectives can also be multidimensional, in which multiple dimensions are considered at the same time, such as
healthy (Sassoon, 2012). Note the constraint that they must be considered at the same time. Long has multiple
dimensions associated with it, but it isn’t multidimensional because the e.g. temporal and spatial dimensions aren’t
considered at the same time.








Figure 3.2: Adjective types and scales
The standard of an adjective is related to the element it is targeting on its scale. For example,
relative adjectives lack scale endpoints, and so are unacceptable with maximality and minimality
modifiers.
(27) a. ??This man is slightly tall
b. ??This man is almost tall
These sentences could be made acceptable, but only when a clear contextual standard is established,
which allows a comparison. There could be an element of coercion or polysemy, but I will argue
that this is because scales are not lexically specified, and can shift depending on appropriate
grammatical and pragmatic context.
3.2 Object-Oriented Depictives and scales
As we’ve seen, depictives can be gradable. Looking again at the examples given by Aarts (1992)
(repeated below), we see that these are fine without very, utterly, and extremely.
(6) a. He painted the housei (*very) unsandedi
b. He met the Directori (*utterly) drunki
c. He ate the nutsi (*extremely) saltedi
Crucially, these are modifiers that force an open scale reading. With closed scale modifiers, the
sentences are far more acceptable.
(28) a. He painted the housei 100% unsandedi
b. He met the Directori completely drunki
c. He ate the nutsi slightly saltedi
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We can then see that the type of scale in gradable adjectives has an effect on the acceptability of the
depictive. Given that we’ve tied scalar structure to the absolute/relative distinction, then a first
hypothesis would be that depictives require absolute adjectives. Gumiel-Molina, Moreno-Quibén,
and Pérez-Jiménez (2016), for example, make this claim with regards to Spanish. If absolute
adjectives are more acceptable than relative adjectives, then this predicts that modifiers which
force a closed scale reading (and hence an absolute reading of an adjective) should repair readings
in cases where the scale is coercible or variable. We can see this with OODs in atelic VPs.
(29) a. ??John pushed the carti brokeni
b. ok/?John pushed the carti completely brokeni
But noticeably, this effect is more apparent with OODs than SODs; we can see that (6b) is
acceptable as a SOD with an open scale adjective, but not as an OOD.
(30) Hei met the Directorj very drunki/∗j
If depictives were required to be absolute adjectives, then we would predict the opposite accept-
ability for this sentence. As such, a restriction on depictives based solely on absolute adjectives is
insufficient. This suggests it might not be (just) the scalar structure of the adjective that is con-
ditioning acceptability. Hence, it is worth looking at alternative explanations for this distribution.
For instance, it could be a case of the relative informativity of the sentence. For example:
(31) John played the guitari untunedi/??tunedi
Tuned is the normal, expected state in performing this action. As such, unacceptability of depictives
with these predicates may be at least partially attributed to pragmatic effects. Suggestive evidence
for this comes from the ability to force contexts in which the depictive is acceptable by signalling
that something is a departure from the normal.
(32) John played the guitari tunedi for a change
Here, the sentence’s improved acceptability might be put down to the increased relevance of the
guitar’s tunedness, since this is interpreted as being more salient in some manner. While this is a
possible account, there are reasons to think that the scalarity of the adjective is what is relevant.
As we can see, the addition of this context also improves the use of completely.
(33) a. ?John played the guitari completely tunedi
b. John played the guitari completely tunedi for a change
While this could be a coincidence that an improvement of the depictive is matched by an im-
provement in completely, this would be explained on an approach where the scale is the relevant
factor, since the improvement of completely indicates that the scale structure has changed.16 Fur-
16 For a change is most likely a modal adverbial. Given work by Lassiter (2011) on the relationship of scalarity
and modals, this interaction is potentially explainable in terms of the underlying structure of the scales involved.
As such, this could be further evidence for the scalarity of the adjective being the relative factor in OODs, rather
than evidence against it. I return to this possibility in the final chapter.
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ther, there are some cases in which the more informative state is judged less acceptable than the
‘expected’ state.
(34) a. ??He carried the bagi damagedi
b. He carried the bagi undamagedi
c. He carried the bagi (still) intacti
The scale structure of adjectives is definitely relevant for the acceptability of depictives, so it is
worthwhile to investigate whether a restriction based on absolute adjectives can be refined. On
a degree scalar account of absolute adjectives, absolute adjectives can be decomposed into three
types of adjectives with different scales.
3.2.1 OODs and scale structure
If depictives are required to be absolute adjectives, then all closed scale adjectives should meet
this requirement. Focussing again on OODs in atelic VPs, we can see that out of the types of
gradable adjectives used as OODs, totally-closed scale adjectives are more readily acceptable than
open scale ones.
(35) a. John carried the bagi emptyi/fulli/openi/closedi
b. ??John carried the bagi heavyi/lighti
However, since the antonyms of absolute adjectives are also absolute adjectives, then this predicts
that antonym pairs should be as acceptable as each other. However, the data shows that not all
absolute adjective pairs are treated the same.
(36) a. John juggled the balls wet[lower closed]/??dry[upper closed]
b. John juggled the balls dirty[lower closed]/??clean[upper closed]
c. John carried the pole bent[upper closed]/??straight[lower closed]
Adjectives that are on a totally-closed scale, or positive adjectives of partially-closed scales are more
acceptable than negative adjectives on partially-closed scales. A useful example is the variable
acceptability of the adjective pair drunk and sober. Sober is the positive member, and is upper-
closed. If the positive polarity of the adjective is the relevant factor, then we would expect it to
be more readily acceptable as a depictive than its negative counterpart drunk.
(37) a. Mary pushed Johni soberi
b. ??/?Mary pushed Johni drunki
We also note that with the addition of completely, drunk improves slightly, but not much. However,
given proper context, the use of completely shows a marked improvement over just drunk.
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(38) John, James and Mary went skydiving. Mary was an expert, but John and James were
both nervous as they were not as experienced. Perhaps unwisely, John decided to have a
drink before jumping, not realising that alcohol has a greater effect at higher altitudes. John
was the most nervous and drank a lot, while James had barely a sip, and Mary – being a
teetotaller – didn’t drink at all. When it came time to jump, John and James both refused
to go, and so Mary had to ‘encourage’ them out. While Mary pushed Jamesi soberi...
a. ...?she pushed Johni drunki
b. ...she pushed Johni completely drunki
An important point here is that completely is a maximality modifier, while drunk is the negative
member on an upper-closed scale. As such, we would expect completely to only have an intensifica-
tional use. But the use of very does not result in an improvement. Further, the use of a minimality
modifier doesn’t improve the depictive either.
(39) ??Mary pushed Johni very/slightly drunki
With this, we can capture the restriction on OODs in atelic VPs. Since we’ve already seen that
OODs are more acceptable if they’re positive or totally closed, then this behaviour can be explained
if we take drunk to have an element of scalar variability, and that it can also appear in a totally-
closed form. If this is correct, then we should expect proportionality modifiers to be acceptable
with drunk.
(40) John is half drunk
This scalar variability allows us to capture these differences; when drunk is combined with com-
pletely – and given a suitable context – drunk can be interpreted as being totally-closed. In these
circumstances, drunk is acceptable as an OOD depictive in an atelic VP.
As a descriptive generalisation, we’ve identified totally-closed scales, and the positive member of
partially-closed scales as being most acceptable in atelic OODs. There are a number of ways to lay-
out this generalisation, depending on the assumptions one adopts about scale structures and their
relation to other divisions. From the point of view of polarity, we can say that all positive adjectives
on closed scales are acceptable, and also negative adjectives on totally-closed scales. If we adopt
the absolute/relative distinction as being primitive, then another possible way of summarising this
restriction is that absolute adjectives are acceptable, except for negative adjectives on partially-
closed scales. This generalisation neatly summarise the data, but leaves unexplained why there is
a split. It also does not explain why atelic OODs have this restriction, and why they are repaired
with certain scale types and not others. To this end, we can split the restriction into two questions
that need to be answered.
1. Why are totally-closed adjectives more acceptable than open-scale adjectives?
2. What decides the difference in acceptability between positive and negative members of
partially-closed scales?
For this thesis, I focus on the first question, though I return to a consideration of the second
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question in chapter 5. So far, we’ve seen that these restrictions on the OOD only appear to arise
with verbs that are atelic; activities or semelfactives. Given this, one might expect that telicity is
a requirement for English OODs. Evidence in support of this comes from the fact that depictives
are acceptable if the sentence is made telic.
(41) a. ??John pushed Maryi drunki
b. John pushed Maryi into the hallway drunki
c. ??John pushed Maryi on the roof drunki
The addition of a directional adverbial in (41b) shifts the sentence to a telic and acceptable one,
while the addition of a locative adverbial in (41c) remains atelic and unacceptable. In a similar
vein, sentences that have a telic interpretation can often be cancelled, but when combined with
depictives, telicity can no longer be cancelled.
(42) John mowed the lawn... but he didn’t finish all of it
a. Johni mowed the lawn drunki... #but he didn’t finish all of it
b. John mowed the lawni weti... #but he didn’t finish all of it
Based on evidence like this, some researchers have claimed that OODs require a telic VP (e.g.
Motut, 2010).17 Considering our discussion of scale structure, this initially has a lot of plausibility,
as telicity is argued to underlie scale structure (Hay, Kennedy, & Levin, 1999; Kennedy & Levin,
2008). Kennedy and Levin argue that the difference between closed and open scales is that:
...the former come with ‘natural transitions’: the transition from a zero to a non-zero
degree on the scale (from not having any degree of the measured property to having
some of it) in the case of an an adjective with a lower closed scale, or the transition from
a non-maximal to a maximal degree (from having an arbitrary degree of the measured
property to having a maximal degree of it) in the case of an adjective with an upper
closed scale.
(Kennedy & Levin, 2008, p. 169)
If differences between closed and open scale structures can be explained in terms of telicity, then
this would unite facts about the scalar semantics of adjectives in depictives, as well as the differences
in acceptability in (41). But this would predict that there should be no OODs with atelic VPs,
and that a shift in acceptability should entail a shift in telicity in the VP. As we can see, this is
not the case.
(43) a. John ate meati rawi for an hour
b. John played the guitari untunedi/#tunedi
c. I juggled the ballsi weti/#dryi
17 This also applies to theories that have aspectual restrictions on verb class, e.g. no OODs with activities or
semelfactive verbs.
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Depictives that use closed scale adjectives are more acceptable than ones that use open scales, but
we see no shift in telicity. As such a telic restriction at the VP level is too strong, and empirically
inadequate. However, there does appear to be an interaction with telicity. I argue that these
differences can be captured, but by formulating differences in telicity and scale structure in terms
of a distinction between quantization and homogeneity (Krifka, 1989; Borer, 2005b, 2005a).
3.3 Quantization and Homogeneity
A predicate is homogeneous if it is both divisive and cumulative, and quantized otherwise. These
divisions can be illustrated using both the nominal, and verbal domains. The nominal domain
shows a split between Mass and Count nouns, while the verbal domain shows a split between telic
and atelic verbs.18
In the nominal domain, nouns can be separated into two categories; Mass nouns and Count nouns.
Count nouns can take plural marking and the indefinite determiner, and show plural marking. In
comparison, Mass nouns cannot be pluralised, don’t appear with the indefinite determiner, and
show singular agreement.19
(44) a. (i) Apples, boxes
(ii) ??Golds, waters
b. (i) an apple, a box
(ii) ??A gold, a water
c. (i) The water is/*are cold
(ii) The apples are/*is fresh
The semantic difference between these types of nouns is important in philosophical literature, with
Quine (1960) famously stating that the difference between Mass and Count nouns was that the
former referred to substances, while the latter referred to objects.20 The insight here is that
objects are internally structured, while substances are not. At the outset, we can distinguish these
primarily on whether they are cumulative or not.21
Something is cumulative if adding two samples of it together results in one sample that has the
same property. For example, water is cumulative in that adding two samples of water results in a
18 This raises the question of whether telicity just is quantization in the verbal domain. I follow Borer (2005a) in
arguing that it is, contra Krifka (1992, 1998). I return to further discussion of this point momentarily.
19 There is actually a more complicated distribution, but I pass over the details here. See Ojeda (2005) on ‘Mass
plurals’.
20 Quine’s approach has an intimate connection to the philosophical notion of ‘reference’ and its role in metaphysics.
While the substance/object divide is a useful heuristic, it does not hold for all uses of the Mass/Count noun
distinction. See Pelletier (2010) for a discussion of the issues.
21 Later, the condition of being divisive was also proposed (Cheng, 1973). Something is divisive if it can be
separated into two parts which both have the same property. Water, is divisive in that separating two parts of water
results in those individual parts being water themselves, while the same does not hold for an apple, since dividing
a whole apple results in part of an apple, not a whole apple. I return to this concept in a moment.
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combined entity that is also water, whereas the count noun apple is not cumulative, as combining
two samples of apple results in a plurality of apples, not a singular, larger sample of an apple.
Link (1983) presented a algebraic-lattice theory that captured these distinctions formally; Mass
and Count nouns can differ in whether they have atomic elements or not. While one need not
explicitly adopt Link’s formalism, a useful insight to draw from this is that semantics of Count
nouns have internal structure, and Mass nouns do not. Bach (1986), applying this reasoning to
the verbal domain, noticed that there were structural correspondences between Mass and Count
nouns in the nominal domain, and atelic and telic verbs in the verbal domain. Building on Link
and Bach’s work, Krifka (1989, 1992, 1998, et seq.), and Verkuyl (1993) gave a formulation of the
telic/atelic distinction in terms of cumulativity and quantization.22
Telic events have a “naturally final endpoint” (Smith, 1991, p. 19), and have a more complex
internal structure than atelic events, which are taken to be unbounded. If we consider an atelic
event like John walks, we see that it is cumulative in a similar way to Mass nouns; combining two
(temporally contiguous) events of John walking results in an event of John walking; if John walks
in the park from 2pm to 3pm, and 3pm to 4pm, then we can say that John walked in the park
from 2pm to 4pm.
A telic event, like a Count noun, is internally structured, and so is not homogeneous. A telic event
like John drank a beer is not cumulative. If we take two events of John drank a beer, this does not
sum into one event of John drinking a beer; if John drank a beer from 2pm to 3pm, and he drank
a beer from 3pm to 4pm, then John didn’t drink a beer from 2pm to 4pm, but rather John drank
two beers from 2pm to 4pm.
Reducing two independent areas down to a single distinction is a powerful theoretical advancement
by itself, but we will see that we can take this further, and show that there are in fact interactions
between the nominal and verbal domain in terms of quantization and homogeneity; nominalisations
show a similar interaction; deverbal nouns derived from atelic predicates are Mass, while ones
derived from telic predicates are Count nouns (Alexiadou, 2011).
It is also well known that the direct object can affect the telicity of a sentence, and ‘measure out
the event’ (Tenny, 1994). For example, if the direct object is a bare plural or Mass noun, or is not
present, only an atelic interpretation is available. If the direct object is a Count noun, then a telic
interpretation is available.
(45) a. John read for an hour/#in an hour
b. John read books for an hour/#in an hour
c. John read the book for an hour/in an hour
22 I present discussion here in Krifka’s terms; Verkyul uses the features ±ADD-TO and ±SQA (Specified Quantity
of A), see Verkuyl (2005) for more detail.
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Verb Noun End Result
+Telic +Count → +Telic
+Telic −Count → −Telic
−Telic ±Count → −Telic
Krifka (1992, 1998) presents a compositional semantics that captures this homomorphism between
the event and the individual denoted by the object. On his account, verbs are inherently atelic
and specify a path, and a quantized object gives rise to the telicity of sentences, by measuring out
the event. Krifka classifies the arguments of predicates that have a homomorphic mapping with
their argument being the Gradual or Successive Patient.
This mapping captures the intuition that there is a correspondence between a change in the object
as the temporal progression of the event continues. So in the case of John drank a beer, subparts
of the overall event correspond with decreases in the part of the object that is the beer, until the
event culminates with the depletion of the parts of the object. The mapping to events ensures that
there is a correspondence between the object and the event, while the mapping to objects ensures
that there is only one specific object in the event.23
This then can be used to formulate the interaction between the predicate and its internal argument;
when a quantized Gradual Patient is combined with a verb (of an appropriate type), this results in
a quantized verbal complex, while a cumulative Gradual Patient combining with a verb will result
in a cumulative verbal complex. As a consequence of Krifka’s model, he argues that every (proper)
part of a telic event must not be a telic event of the same type, i.e. something that is quantized
cannot be cumulative. This raises issues with sentences like:
(47) a. John walked to the store
b. The ship sank
The sentences in (47) are telic, but have proper (sub)parts of their events which are those events.
E.g., there is a proper subpart of the ship having sank that is the ship having sank. As a con-
sequence of Krifka’s definition of quantization, he is forced to state that although telicity and
quantization are related, the relationship is asymmetric; on Krifka’s account, a predicate being
quantized necessitates that the predicate is telic, but being telic does not necessitate that the pred-
icate is quantized. While initially we might see this split between quantization and telicity as being
useful in accounting for the difference in OODs, we see other reasons for revising quantization to
match telicity.
In contrast to Krifka’s account, Borer (2005a) argues that there may be some quantized predicates
23 The uniqueness of objects accounts for situations in which an event is repeatable. This requirement means that
there is only one object related to the event. To illustrate this, take the sentences:
(46) a. John sang this song on the street corner for three years
b. ?John composed this song on the street corner for three years
If we contrast these two sentences, we can see that the former is pragmatically more acceptable with the durative
adverbial while the latter isn’t because this song can be sung multiple times, but can only be composed once.
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that do have such proper parts, i.e. something may be quantized and satisfy cumulativity. As
such, Borer revises Krifka’s original conditions to add divisiveness:24
(48) a. P is homogeneous iff P is cumulative and divisive
i. P is divisive iff ∀x [P(x ) → ∃y(P(y) ∧ y < x )] ∧ ∀x,y [P(x ) ∧ P(y) ∧ y < x →
P(x–y)]
ii. P is cumulative iff ∀x [P(x ) ∧ P(y) → P(x ∪ y)]
b. P is quantized iff P is not homogeneous
(Definition adapted from Borer, 2005b, 2005a)
Returning to the examples given above for telic and atelic events, we see that John drank a beer
is not divisive, since dividing John drinking a beer into e.g. two parts is not John drinking a beer,
but rather is John drank a part of a beer. Likewise, John walks is divisive, in that a part of the
event of John walking is also an event of John walking. Barring practical considerations, we can
divide up the event of John walking into ever smaller (sub)events of John walking.
For Borer, given an appropriate syntactic projection (in this case, AspP), a quantized object or
suitable adverbial of quantization will induce telicity. This change predicts the emergence of telic
readings without co-finality (Borer, 2005a, p. 148). She gives the following examples of this:
(49) a. Kim ate more than enough meat
b. Robin read at least three books
c. We filled the room with smoke
(Example from Borer, 2005a, p. 149)
In addition to co-finality being a special case of telicity, it also makes co-initiality a special case as
well. In the cases of co-finality and co-initiality, telicity (quantization) will arise. This will have
implications for the formulation of depictives, and I discuss this in more detail in the next chapter.
But first, I want to focus on another point raised by Borer, and how this can be related to the
scalar variability of sentences. Borer argues that predicates will be interpreted as being quantized
or homogeneous depending on the syntactic context they appear in. This very neatly captures
the fact that many nouns can be interpreted in either a Mass or Count way, and the same for
verbs in regards to the telic/atelic distinction. Take again, the addition of plurals or an indefinite
determiner to a seemingly prototypical Mass noun like water.
(50) a. There is a water on the table
b. There are several waters in the fridge
In these contexts, water no longer functions like a Mass noun, but is interpreted as a Count noun.
In (50a), water is interpreted similarly to a bottle of water, while (50b) receives either the former
24 Borer uses the term quantity, but I’ve kept the term quantization here as I believe it is more transparent in this
context.
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reading, or refers to different kinds of water. The same opposite can be done for prototypical Count
nouns as well:
(51) There is dog on the table
The limitations on this is whether a suitable interpretation can be assigned according to world-
knowledge. I argue that this can be applied to depictives, and that suitable context can repair
readings of depictives. The limits of acceptability appear to be set by whether a given adjective
can be interpreted as being on a totally-closed scale. Together, these show the importance of
contextual standards, and their role in the interpretation of the depictive. As an example, take
the use of high and low, which are generally considered relative adjectives. But we can see that
they’re acceptable with depictives.
(52) Mary carried the bagi highi/lowi
A crucial observation is that being in a depictive puts limitations on the meaning of the adjective—
it cannot be the case that Mary carried the bag and she was either at a high or low altitude (and
hence the bag would be high or low). It can only mean that the bag was carried high or low relative
to how high Mary’s possible range of carrying is. In order to be acceptable, the depictive has strict
restrictions on how it is interpreted, and what the depictive property is being compared to. We
can see that when in the depictive construction, high and low take degree modifiers indicating that
they have a different scale structure.
(53) a. Mary carried the bag slightly high/low
b. Mary carried the bag almost too high/low
Another way of phrasing this is that the standards are at least partially affected by the context
and pragmatic knowledge, and that the variability in scales depends on an appropriate context and
interpretation of an adjective with the relevant scale structure. With this, there are two important
points worth considering. The first is that there is an issue of scalar variability, with adjectives
sometimes being associated with multiple scales. We can see this with dry, which is associated
with multiple scales.
Kennedy and McNally (2005) distinguish between two different meanings of dry ; one on which it
is the average degree of moisture in the atmosphere, and one on which it is the amount of liquid
on a surface. As they note, the former is more or less a permanent property, while the latter is a
transient one. In terms of scales, dry qua average degree of moisture has an open scale, whereas
dry qua amount of liquid has an absolute scale.
(54) a. (i) This region is very dry
(ii) ??This table is very dry
b. (i) This region is very dry for the Amazon
(ii) ??This table is very dry for a study desk
The second point is that even though there may be specified values on closed scales, this does not
mean they’re context-independent. For example, while full is an absolute adjective, what counts
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as ‘full’ can differ from situation to situation. Consider:
(55) a. This beer glass is full
b. This wine glass is full
As McNally (2009) notes, for (55a), the usual interpretation is that the glass is full to the brim.
However, for (55b), a ‘full’ wine glass may be less than half of its total available volume. Likewise,
a ‘full’ espresso coffee cup will have volume left over. World knowledge, then, plays a role in the
acceptability of scales. I argue that we can use Borer’s view to account for the improvement of
OODs in atelic VPs through the use of scale modifiers and context. But first, it is important to
set out how we are treating scales.
3.3.1 Formalising scales
I assume a λ-categorical language (Heim & Kratzer, 1998), minimally with type e for entities,
and type t for truth-values. The type d for degrees is also introduced, and instead of denoting
a property, an adjective like tall denotes a relationship between the individual and a degree on
its scale. A scale is defined as a triple ⟨S,R,∆⟩, where S is a set of degrees d ; R is a transitive,
antisymmetric, reflexive ordering relationship ⪯ such that it satisfies totality and density ; and ∆
is some dimension of measurement (e.g. temperature, width, length etc).
The totality relationship is that for any two degrees, if they are non-identical, then they are ordered
with respect to each other. A scale is dense if for any two degrees, there’s a degree that exists
between them.
(56) a. Totality: ∀d,d ′ ∈ S : d ⪯ d ′ ∨d ′ ⪯ d
b. Density: d ⪯ d ′ → ∃d′′ ∈ S such that d ⪯ d ′′ ∧ d ′′ ⪯ d ′
A scale can be ordered so it is either increasing (⪯) or decreasing (⪰).25 Gradable adjectives are
analysed as measure functions, of the type <d,<e,t>>.26
(57) a. [[Gradable Adjective]] = λdλx.G(d)(x )
b. [[tall ]] = λdλx.tall(d)(x )
This account works straightforwardly for sentences where an explicit degree is given (e.g. John
is six feet tall), but would result in an apparent type-mismatch if no explicit degree is present
(e.g. John is tall); the gradable adjective needs to combine with degree morphology in order to
give the correct denotation for a property of an individual, <e,t>. To handle this, we can posit a
phonetically null morpheme pos. Because there is no explicit degree given in the positive form of an
adjective, the pos morpheme has a contextually specified standard stndc27 within its denotation,
which is interpreted as the smallest degree on the scale that satisfies the given property. The
25 We can also define ≺ based on ⪯: d ≺ d ′ is equivalent to d ⪯ d ′ ∧ d ̸= d ′. ≻ is done analogously.
26 <d,<e,t>> or <e,<d,t>> can be used, the choice mostly depending on the syntactic assumptions used for
composing the subject with the main predicate. I adopt the former for ease of exposition.
27 Alternatively, this can be split into a separate pronominal that pos combines with.
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morpheme pos is of the type <<d,<e,t>>,<e,t>>, and combines with the adjective to return the
proper type for a property.
(58) [[pos]] = λGλx.∃d [d ⪰ stndc(G) ∧ G(d)(x )]
In the case of tall, this is then interpreted as:
(59) a. John is tall
b. ∃d [d ⪰ stndc(tall) ∧ tall(d)(John) ]
Degrees can be compared on the same scale, but not across scales, which explains the inability to
order things across different dimensions of measurement (e.g. temperature and length). Impor-
tantly, while standards for open scales have to be contextually set, the standard of closed scales
default to the maximum or minimum value on the scale. Set-theoretically, we can define the dif-
ferent scale types based on whether they reach or just approach their endpoints. Totally-closed
scales have two endpoints on opposite ends of the scale, while open scales have neither.
(60) Scale types
a. totally-closed {d : 0 ≤ d ≤ 1} [0, 1]
b. upper-closed {d : 0 < d ≤ 1} (0, 1]
c. lower-closed {d : 0 ≤ d < 1} [0, 1)
d. open {d : 0 < d < 1} (0, 1)
In our account, we use the pos morpheme due to type considerations. Ideally, we’d want to have
an account that combines the different types of pos with scales. Kennedy (2007) proposes to
unify pos by positing the function s, which chooses the standard of comparison appropriate to the
context.28
28 Kennedy (2007) has gradable adjectives as having the type <e,d>. This would require pos to be of the type







The differences are not important for my account, and I present Kennedy’s denotations in the form he uses them.
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(61) a. [[pos]] = λGλx.G(x ) ⪰ s(G)
b. s(G(x )) =

G(x) = max(G) if max(G) is defined,
G(x) ≻ min(G) if min(G) is defined,
G(x) ⪰ stnd(G) elsewhere
He argues that this arises from an economy condition, which seeks to use whatever standard is
most available for a scale (in the case of closed adjectives, their endpoint), and only use a point
elsewhere on the scale as a last resort.
(62) Interpretive Economy
Maximize the contribution of the conventional meanings of the elements of a sentence to the
computation of its truth condition.
(Kennedy, 2007)
For gradable adjectives that have (only) a maximum or minimum standard, then interpretive
economy will ensure that these are selected over the relative scale interpretation. For totally-
closed scales, there are two possible standards to select from. This predicts that totally-closed
scales like open should be able to have a maximal interpretation in some contexts, and a minimal
interpretation in others.
(63) a. If the airlock is open, the cabin will depressurize
b. The ship can’t be taken out of the station until the space door is open
(Example from Kennedy (2007))
This would account for cases of polysemy, like the two interpretations of dry, but has a greater
difficulty in explaining how meanings of the same type can be compared on different scales. To
capture this, I argue that we can split the pos morpheme into three types, which are specified for
the different scale options, and that these types apply to adjectives as far as pragmatic and world
knowledge allows it, in the style of Borer (2005b, 2005a) and her distinction between grammatical
knowledge and encyclopaedic knowledge.29
This has a number of consequences. Essentially, adjectives can be combined with any form of
pos. The factors blocking certain uses of adjectives do not stem from the lexical semantics of the
adjective, but rather arise from our world knowledge; if a suitable interpretation can be assigned,
then it will be acceptable, otherwise the combination will result in unacceptability because there’s
no coherent interpretation of it. This removes the need for Kennedy’s economy position, and splits
his function s into three separate morphemes instead.











a. [[posopen]] = λGλx.∃d [d ⪰ stndc(G) ∧ G(d)(x )]
b. [[posupper closed]] = λGλx.∃d [d = maxc(G) ∧ G(d)(x )]
c. [[poslower closed]] = λGλx.∃d [d ≻ minc(G) ∧ G(d)(x )]
With this, we can capture the shifting of the scale, and how this improves the acceptability of
depictives. An important point here is that depictives are more acceptable as far as a speaker
is able to assign a proper contextual interpretation to them. For some speakers, there may be
more or less allowance in scalar variability, and hence differences in acceptability. I take this
point to be in favour of my account here, as the takeaway point is that depictives are not wholly
unacceptable in these environments, but must be interpreted in a certain way, or put within a
certain context.
To illustrate this, consider bent versus straight again. Bent is the positive pair of the adjective
pair, and so can be predicated of the object of an activity verb without issue. However, when the
negative adjective straight is used, the interpretation shifts:
(65) a. He carried the polei benti
b. He carried the polei straighti
Bent can be a property of the pole and describes how the pole was at the time of the main event,
but straight cannot be interpreted in this way. Instead, straight (if it is deemed acceptable) has to
be a property of how the pole is carried; the secondary predicate is interpreted in such a way that
there is a bounded range for the property. This can be seen by the fact that scale structure tests
give different results for straight depending on whether it is used in the OOD or not.
(66) a. (i) The pole is almost straight
(ii) ??The pole is slightly straight
b. (i) He carried the polei [slightly straight]i
(ii) He carried the polei [almost straight]i
Note that this is not forced on positive adjectives like bent, which still shows the same scale
structure, indicating that this is a requirement on negative adjectives, which are only acceptable
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in activity OODs with totally-closed scales.
(67) a. (i) The pole is slightly bent
(ii) ??The pole is almost bent
b. (i) He carried the polei [slightly bent]i
(ii) ??He carried the polei [almost bent]i
This puts us in a position to give a better account of OODs. In this chapter, I’ve shown that
the scale structure of adjectives is the relevant factor to the differing acceptability of OODs. The
important empirical observation here is that OODs predicated of objects of activity verbs are
acceptable if the scale structure is closed, and unacceptable if the scale structure is open. By
analysing the open/closed scale distinction more in-depth, I’ve argued that the difference in scale
structure ultimately boils down to a distinction between quantization and homogeneity. By using
my quantization analysis, we can capture the variable acceptability of OODs with activity verbs
better than previous accounts.
Further, we’ve seen that the quantization/homogeneity distinction underlies the difference between
telicity and atelicity in the verbal domain. I’ve posited that depictives have a sensitivity to quantiza-
tion. This not only explains the interaction between the telicity of the sentence and the depictive,
and the improvement of depictives with closed scale adjectives, but also correctly predicts that
contexts and modifiers that force closed scale readings will improve OOD depictives with activity
verbs.
In the next chapter, I expand on this analysis, and further explore depictives and quantization. I
will show how my quantization analysis can unite several seemingly unrelated features of depictives.




So far we have seen that the quantization status of the depictive conditions its acceptability. Quan-
tization cuts across a number of different areas of the grammar. If quantization is relevant to
depictives, then we would expect to see interaction with depictives as far as different parts of the
grammar reflect this distinction or interact with it. This makes a number of testable predictions to
the effect that depictive acceptability should change with various construction types. At first pass,
this should seem to predict that only Stage-Level Predicates (SLPs) can be depictives. However,
while this has been claimed in the past, we have seen that in chapter 1 that this cannot be the
case. But SLPs do show a special interaction with depictives and there is a strong preference for
depictives to be SLPs, and this should be explained.
I will show how this preference can be explained in terms of quantization, but does not necessarily
mean that depictives are restricted to being SLPs. I show how other factors can influence the
appearance of ILP depictives. By demonstrating how such factors can interact, I show that such
an analysis makes predictions about the relationship of the quantization status of the object and
the depictive, which can explain previously overlooked phenomena.
Based on this and the behaviour demonstrated in the previous chapter, I formulate the Depictive
Aspectuality Constraint, which captures these factors. In essence, I argue that depictives are
sensitive to quantization. The acceptability of depictives depends on the orientation of the depictive
(i.e. whether it is an OOD or a SOD), the type of entity it is predicated of (e.g. Count vs Mass
noun), and the status of the VP it is in (e.g. telic or atelic). I show how this constraint not
only captures the behaviour of depictives, but explains how they can be repaired. I show that
quantization is at the root of understanding how depictives function.
However, I will also show that quantization is only part of the story, and I address the limitations of
the Depictive Aspectuality Constraint as formulated purely in terms of quantization. So far I have
concentrated mostly on OODs predicated of objects of activity and accomplishment verbs, but this
leaves open semelfactives and achievement verbs. Building on my quantization analysis, I show
how my Depictive Aspectuality Constraint can be reformulated to consider lexical aspect more
generally, and extend its empirical coverage of depictive behaviour to capture depictive behaviour
with objects of achievement and semelfactive verbs as well.
4.1 The Stage-Level Predicate Preference
As noted in chapter 1, the acceptability of depictives appears to be dependent on whether they are
SLPs or ILPs, with depictives restricted to being SLPs.
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(1) a. (i) John arrived drunk
(ii) ??John arrived French
b. (i) John returned bloody
(ii) ??John returned blond
However, researchers have differed on the strength of the SLP restriction, ranging from claiming
that ILPs are outright banned (Rapoport, 1991), to arguing that ILPs are acceptable if context
allows a transitory interpretation (Rothstein, 1983), to arguing that ILPs are acceptable in depictive
constructions (Condoravdi, 1992; McNally, 1994). Regardless of position on ILPs, it is clear that
there is a preference for depictives to be SLPs. As such, it is important not only to explain the
status of ILP depictives, but also the preference for SLPs.
In general, properties that receive a transitory interpretation are acceptable as depictives. For
example, (1aii) is interpretable in a number of contexts. For example, if John is travelling to France
and is waiting for citizenship papers to be processed during his flight, then (1aii) is acceptable. Or,
if French is interpreted stereotypically, such as in John arrives as a costume party dressed as a
Frenchman, then it is also acceptable.
Likewise, for (1bii), the most straight-forward interpretation is that John was not blond when he
left, which accords with the change of state interpretation enforced by the depictive construction.
However, we can also imagine a situation in which we expected John to change hair colour, e.g. a
scenario in which all new employees of a company have dyed their hair red. John’s blondness is
then unexpected, or informative in some manner.
In both these cases, the depictive is being analysed as something that is either temporary, or
signals a change from one point to another. It is important to note that French on the citizenship
papers reading doesn’t become less permanent. The question here is whether this change signals a
coercion from ILPs to SLPs or not. I argue that this issue arises from real world knowledge about
permanent properties and their relationship to the ILP/SLP distinction, and that permanence of
properties is not a good guide to whether a property is a SLP or ILP.1 Consider again the examples
given in chapter 1.
(2) a. Poe died a pauper
b. They left the Army fervent noninterventionists
c. My dad was born compulsive and will die compulsive
d. The tablecloth went to the cleaners white and came back yellowish
(Examples from McNally, 1994)
The example (2a) is of particular importance, as it is largely agreed upon that nominal predicates
are always individual-level (Fernald, 2000, p. 13). Fernald argues against a coercion account in
depictives, noting that:
1 This echoes earlier points, such as Carlson (1977, p. 72) noting that be dead is a SLP.
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Although change-of-state predicates are SLPs due to the fact that they involve a state
changing at a particular time, the result of a change of state is still a state. [...] A
change of state is an eventuality that involves a change in the truth value of a stative
predication. Changing the truth of a proposition does not require the ILP/SLP status
of the predicate to change. Thus, we conclude that a changed state (itself the result of
a change of state) preserves the ILP/SLP status of the original predicate. Therefore,
the predicative final NP in examples like [2a] are ILPs, after all. So both SLPs and
ILPs can appear in depictives.
(Fernald, 2000, p. 31)
In discussing whether ILPs are coerced, it is important to distinguish between a grammatical
change and a pragmatic/world-knowledge change. For instance, consider the following example
from Chierchia (1995):
(3) John was intelligent on Tuesday, but a vegetable on Wednesday
As Chierchia (1995, p. 178) points out, if we “imagine that John has a double personality which
involves switching his mental capacities on and off in an abnormal manner”, then (3) is acceptable.
This is not an instance of coercion, but rather changing the background knowledge and not the
meaning of intelligent. A key thing to note about such examples is that speakers understand what
must change in order for such a sentence to become felicitous. I take this to be evidence that there
is a strong preference for SLPs.
This then raises the question of why there is a preference for depictives to be SLPs. Following
Husband (2012), I will argue that the SLP/ILP distinction reflects a grammatical distinction
between quantization and homogeneity, and it is again the underlying factor of quantization that
depictives are sensitive to.2
4.1.1 Quantization and Stage-Level Predicates
In a traditional feature analysis, ILPs and SLPs differ in the ‘telic’ feature (Smith, 1991; Olsen,
1997; Kearns, 2000),3. The presence of this feature is given as the reason why SLPs are interpreted
as being transitory.
2 Cf. Jäger (1996, 1999, 2001), who argues that the SLP/ILP distinction is actually a cluster of phenomena. Jäger
(1999) breaks down the SLP/ILP distinction into a combination of three properties; whether the predicate admits
a weak/existential reading of indefinite subjects, whether the predicate can occur in the non-finite complement of
verbs of perception, and whether it denotes a transitory property. For our purposes, whether a property is transitory
is most important – Jäger argues that whether the predicate is transitory or not is pragmatic in nature and not a
grammatical feature. I agree that there is a pragmatic/world-knowledge factor to this, but will maintain that the
distinction corresponds to a grammatical feature.




SLP 0 + +
ILP 0 + 0
Table 4.1: Feature classification of SLPs and ILPs
We have already shown that telicity has a correspondence to quantization, and so SLPs have a
correspondence to quantization. This correspondence to quantization can further be demonstrated
by using the distinction between closed and open scale adjectives, and their interaction with the
SLP/ILP distinction. To show this, consider the difference between generic and existential inter-
pretations of statives. Differences in the direct object that a stative verb takes can result in a
difference between a stage-level and individual-level interpretation:
(4) a. Veterans remember
b. Veterans remember battles
c. Veterans remember this battle
(Example from Fernald, 2000)
The presence of a specific direct object licenses an existential interpretation of Veterans (i.e. some
specific veterans remember this battle), whereas a bare plural or Mass noun allows only a generic
reading. This is strikingly similar to the situation where the direct object affects the telicity of the
VP with eventive verbs.
Husband (2012) demonstrates that the difference stems from whether the direct object is quan-
tized or not, and that a quantized direct object allows for an existential interpretation, whereas
a homogeneous one only allows a generic interpretation. Husband also shows that whether scalar
adjectives are open or closed scale can affect the interpretations available:
(5) a. Whiskey bottles are brown
b. Whiskey bottles are full
(Example from Husband, 2012)
While (5a) allows only a generic reading, (5b) also allows an existential reading. Husband argues
that existential interpretation is a property predicating over a single (quantized) stage of an individ-
ual, whereas a generic interpretation is predicated over all (homogeneous) stages of an individual.
Closed scale adjectives have telic endpoints and are quantized, whereas open scale adjectives are
homogeneous (Kennedy & Levin, 2008; Husband, 2012).
On the basis of evidence like the interaction above, Husband concludes that SLPs are quantized,
while ILPs are homogeneous. While traditionally the SLP/ILP distinction has been argued to be
a lexical one, Husband (2012) proposes that the structure that adjectives are embedded in gives
the event structure, similar to Borer’s approach to the Mass/Count distinction, and telicity.
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If there is a requirement for a depictive to be quantized, then this explains the preference for SLPs.
However, an obvious issue here is that if ILPs are not quantized, and quantization is a requirement,
then why can ILPs appear in the depictive construction? Crucially, McNally (1994, p. 5) observes
that ILP depictives are acceptable when the main clause supports a change-of-state reading of the
depictive. McNally argues that there must be a temporal parameter. So, in the case of My dad
was born compulsive:
Although we normally individuate a state of affairs such as my father’s being compulsive
maximally, i.e. we consider there to be exactly one such state of affairs extending for e.g.
my father’s entire life, we may, in virtue of the atelicity of individual level properties,
nonetheless take any subportion of the interval in which his compulsiveness obtains and
identify that with a state of affairs of his being compulsive - including an interval that
is coextensive with his birth.
(McNally, 1994, p. 8)
On McNally’s view, a depictive is acceptable if it holds over the same temporal interval as the
entity its predicate of, and pragmatic reasons generally rule out ILPs. Taking McNally’s insight, I
argue that ILPs are acceptable as depictives in these cases because the change of state is associated
with telicity, and introduces quantization into the verb-object-depictive complex.
In the same way that a VP can be made telic through the addition of a certain type of adverbial,
I argue that quantization can be introduced into the overall verb-object-depictive complex, and
that a depictive is acceptable if this quantization is present. In effect, this means that depictives
do require quantization, but that quantization needn’t come from the depictive itself, and can be
introduced in multiple ways.
Suggestive evidence for this comes from the fact that ILP OODs are harder to find than ILP SODs,
which McNally notes. This mirrors the sensitivity to verb classes that adjectival OODs have that
SODs don’t. She gives the following examples of ILP OODs:
(6) a. Ernest’s parents sent himi off to boarding school an immature brati, and he came back
just as bratty
b. George Bush was born a Republican, and they will bury himi a Republicani
In the case of sent, it is useful to see how much the sentence can be altered while still retaining
acceptability. The sentence is still acceptable when the goal is dropped, but is degraded if the
particle off is removed:
(7) a. They sent himi off an immature brati, and he came back just as bratty
b. ?They sent himi to boarding school an immature brati, and he came back just as
bratty
Similarly, bury is an accomplishment, the object of which is less restricted than other verb classes
for OODs. Roughly similar examples for other verb classes are largely unacceptable.
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(8) a. ??John watched the politiciani a presidenti
b. ??The team acquired the playeri a winneri
c. ??John hit the kidi an immature brati
Here, we see again a trademark interaction of the depictive with verb classes. Like the interaction
with activity verbs and closed scale adjectives, I argue that this can be traced to quantization and
the manner in which it can be introduced into the verb-object-depictive complex. Leaving further
details aside for the moment in how this functions, we can see that we’ve identified a number of
different phenomena involving depictives, especially object-oriented depictives.
• Preference for depictives to be SLP; ILP depictives are acceptable when there’s a change of
state
• Telic modifiers improve OODs with activity verbs
• Closed scale adjectives are more acceptable than open scale adjectives for OODs
Looking at the quantization/homogeneity distinction, we can see that these improvements in ac-






Table 4.2: Quantization/Homogeneity distinction across different domains
This then makes the that prediction we should see an interaction between depictives and Mass
nouns. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Mass/Count distinction in the nominal domain
shows structural similarities to the atelic/telic distinction in the verbal domain; Mass nouns and
bare plurals are both cumulative and divisive, and so are homogeneous. This homogeneity would
pose an issue for depictives, as quantization is a requirement.
4.1.2 Mass nouns, Bare plurals, and habitual readings
As expected, we see such an interaction, especially for OODs predicated of Mass nouns. When the
object of a sentence is a Mass noun or a bare plural, the addition of an OOD causes a habitual
interpretation to be favoured over an episodic interpretation.
(9) a. John drank beer
b. John drank beeri warmi
In (9), the addition of the OOD warm leads to a strong preference for a habitual interpretation,
and an episodic interpretation becomes much more dispreferred as compared to the sentence minus
the secondary predicate. This effect is consistent across verb classes.
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(10) a. John drank milki warmi [Accomplishment]
b. John pushed cartsi emptyi [Activity]
c. John noticed beesi angryi [Achievement]
d. John knocked vasesi fulli [Semelfactive]
However, when a determiner or numeral is added, this effect disappears.
(11) John drank the/a/five beer(s) warm... and went home
Notably, the effect disappearing happens with all determiners, regardless of whether they are weak
(property-denoting) or strong (quantificational) (Milsark, 1977; McNally, 1998). This is expected
on a quantized/homogeneous approach, as weak determiners are grouped with strong determiners













Table 4.3: Weak/Strong distinction vs Quantization/Homogeneity distinction
This predicts that we should see the same effect with bare plurals, since they are grouped with
Mass nouns due to being homogeneous. As expected, we see that this is true.
(12) a. John drank beers... and went home
b. John drank beers warm... ??and went home
We also see that the addition of some adverbials allows an episodic interpretation, but others do
not; noticeably, directional adverbials allow for episodic interpretations, whereas this does not hold
for locative ones.
(13) a. (i) John drank beer warm on the way to the beach
(ii) On the way to the beach, John drank beer warm
b. (i) John drank beer warm on the beach
(ii) In England, John drank beer warm
This accords with observations made about activity verbs and depictives in the last chapter, in
that directional adverbials improve depictives but locative adverbials do not. We would expect
then habituality to have a tie to quantization somehow, but how is this mediated? To handle
habitual (and generic) interpretations of sentences, we can introduce a quantifier GEN (Krifka
et al., 1995). GEN is a covert Adverb of Quantification (AdvQ), which takes scope over the entire
sentence. A well-known phenomena is that AdvQs may range over the interpretation of the event
or the interpretation of the subject (Milsark, 1974; Lewis, 1975; Heim, 1982; Doetjes, 1997).
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(14) a. During the summer, water in the pond mostly evaporates
b. Water in the pond is mostly lost through evaporation
(Example from Borer, 2005a)
In (14a), the AdvQ ranges over the subject, while in (14b) it ranges over the event. We can see
this in comparing the readings; in (14b) it is the case that most events of water being lost are
those of evaporation, while (14a) only requires that most of the water evaporate. Crucially, when
a DP-internal quantifier is added, the AdvQ can only range over the event.
(15) Most/all water in the pond mostly evaporates
Borer argues that this can be accounted for by an interaction between the AdvQ and quantization.
On this view, by assuming that homogeneous OODs like warm must be predicated of a quantized
object, and that speakers analyse sentences in a way that maximize the likelihood of interpretation,
we can give an explanation of the preference for habitual interpretations with depictives. With the
requirement for a quantized object, a depictive predicated of a Mass noun or bare plural object
can receive a legitimate interpretation if GEN is present. As such, this leads to the preference for
a habitual interpretation, as the speaker assumes that the object is appropriately quantized, which
would be achieved if the covert GEN operator is present.
If overt material or context sufficient for appropriate scalar variability is provided, then the GEN
quantifier does not need to be interpreted as being present, and so an episodic interpretation
is possible. This means that the habitual interpretation is a preference, but not a necessity for
Mass/bare plural objects, as quantization can be introduced in a number of ways. This account has
the added benefit of explaining the well-noted fact that generic interpretations improve depictives
(Halliday, 1967; Stump, 1985; Hale & Keyser, 1998). Here, GEN can introduce quantization, which
improves the addition of depictives.4
(16) a. He won’t drink orange juicei neati freshi
b. You can’t cook chickensi tenderi youngi
(Example from Simpson, 2005)
In the case of the preference for habitual readings, this predicts that if quantization is introduced
into depictives predicated of Mass nouns and bare plurals another way, this should improve the
acceptability of an episodic reading. The natural way of testing this is by manipulating the
scale structure of the adjective. Examining warm, we see that it is a relative adjective. With
an absolute adjective like raw, we can see that the preference for the habitual interpretation has
largely decreased, and that many outright prefer an episodic interpretation if the construction isn’t
ambiguous between them:
4 It is not clear why genericity and quantization are associated, and I do not give an account for what this
interaction is, only that there is one. Borer offers a particular mechanism for this interaction, but it is not required
for my analysis.
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(17) a. I ate meat raw... and went home
b. John ate meat raw... and went home
c. I ate cookie dough raw from the store, will I die? (Google)
d. We even drank eggs raw (Google)
e. I drank milk raw and my stomach started to hurt so bad (Google)
4.2 The Depictive Aspectuality Constraint
As shown in the previous section, again we see that introducing quantization improves the accept-
ability of depictives. However, the most important fact is that quantization can be introduced
into the sentence in multiple ways. Focussing on OODs, we can see a systematic interaction with
quantization and acceptability of sentences. Based on these observations, I formulate the Depictive
Aspectuality Constraint (DAC):
(18) Depictive Aspectuality Constraint (1st Version): For an Object-Oriented Depictive,
the verb-object-depictive complex must be aspectually compatible with quantization.
On this view, an OOD is more acceptable if the verb-object-depictive complex is suitably quantized.
The verb-object-depictive complex can become quantized in a number of ways:
Domain Improves OOD Degrades OOD
Verbal Telic VP Atelic VP
Nominal Specific object Mass or Bare plural object
Adjectival Closed scale adjective Open scale adjective
Predicate Stage-Level Predicate Individual-Level Predicate
Event Change of state interpretation No change of state interpretation
Quantization Homogeneity
Table 4.4: Factors that affect acceptability of Object-Oriented Depictives
Notably, this restriction does not apply to accomplishments, which is expected under the Depictive
Aspectuality Constraint because accomplishments are telic and durative. This constraint also has
the benefit of explaining why depictives can be repaired by introducing other material from a range
of sources, or context which affects the interpretation of the sentence; in these cases, quantization
is being introduced into the verb-object-depictive complex.
However, the constraint as currently formulated incorrectly predicts that objects of achievement
verbs should also be acceptable. If we compare the verb classes with SLPs and ILPs, we see that the
uniting factor appears to be the twin requirements of durativity and telicity (Olsen, 1997).
67
Dynamic Durative Telic
Accomplishment + + +
Activity + + 0
Achievement + 0 +
Semelfactive + 0 0
SLP 0 + +
ILP 0 + 0
Table 4.5: Feature classification verb classes and states
Both SLPs and accomplishment verbs are durative and telic, and they are the least restricted in
terms of their acceptability as depictives. ILPs and activity verbs, on the other hand, are durative
but not telic. However, if a temporal bound is introduced in the sentence, such as a change of
state for the main verb if the depictive is an ILP, or a directional adverb for activity verbs, then
depictives become more acceptable, because they now have a temporal point to be predicated
of.
This explains the change in acceptability for activity verbs when made telic, but leaves the shifting
acceptability of achievements and semelfactives unexplained. Looking again at the feature chart,
we can see that the key factor here is durativity. The verb-object complex of accomplishment
verbs is both telic and durative, but objects of activity, achievement, and semelfactive verbs do not
automatically meet this standard, as they are atelic or nondurative or both. We see that in the
cases where quantization can be introduced, this improves the acceptability of depictives where
durativity is already present. As we’ve seen, this can be satisfied in a number of ways. For example,
the quantization requirement can be satisfied through properties that are structurally correlated to
quantization (e.g. telicity). Furthermore, they can be introduced into the construction in multiple
ways. In fact, the same holds for durativity, which – similar to quantization – can be introduced
through scale structure.
4.2.1 Depictives and durativity
Previous work on resultatives and scale type shows a correlation between the durativity of an
event and the gradability of scales (Wyngaerd, 2001; Beavers, 2002; Wechsler, 2005); durative
events require gradable scales, while punctual events require non-gradable scales. Beavers (2008)
expands on this, arguing that dynamic predicates correlate durativity with gradability. Gradability
and quantization map onto durativity and telicity respectively, and so when the depictive is a
closed scale adjective, it can introduce quantization and durativity into the verb-object-depictive
complex.
Focusing on achievements, we see that they are distinguished from accomplishments by being
nondurative. If we can introduce durativity into the depictive construction similar to telicity with
activity verbs, then this should improve the acceptability of OODs with achievement verbs. If we
could mix across domains, then we would expect that gradable, open scale adjectives would be
acceptable with achievements. Attested examples can be found:
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(19) a. I met him very drunk (Google)
b. [We] both met himi drunki at 4am in McDonalds (Google)
c. (In the context of realising a house has heated tiles) I just noticed the tilesi warmi today
(Google)
d. I’ve vaguely noticed (and expected) some warmth from the gearbox tunnel on long
journeys. Recently though I noticed it HOT rather than warm. (Google)
We can revise the Depictive Aspectuality Constraint accordingly:
(20) Depictive Aspectuality Constraint (2nd Version): For an Object-Oriented depictive,
the verb-object-depictive complex must be aspectually compatible with durativity and quanti-
zation.
Features corresponding to durativity and telicity need to be introduced into the depictive-event
complex. The morpheme pos from the previous chapter has three forms, open, upper closed, and
lower closed. All three of these are gradable, and the latter two also introduce quantization into
the adjective. These features can satisfy the Depictive Aspectuality Constraint.
4.2.2 Co-initiality and the Depictive Aspectuality Constraint
Following the analysis laid out in chapter 2, depictives have a spatiotemporal argument, and this
argument must align with the matrix event it is composing with. The secondary predicate is a
small clause that introduces its own event which needs to compose with the matrix event. The








Figure 4.1: Adjectival Depictive
The depictive must have an identifiable temporal bound and a duration that overlaps with the
runtime of the main event. Furthermore, we see that from previous discussion in the second
chapter that the depictive must be co-initial with the matrix event. That is, the property in the
depictive must hold from the beginning of the relevant temporal bound of the matrix event. We
see from the below example (repeated from chapter 2), that the depictive need not hold of the
entire matrix event:
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(21) They dissected the animali alivei
This holds for SODs and OODs, and so we can revise the Depictive Aspectuality Constraint a final
time:
(22) Depictive Aspectuality Constraint (Final Version):
1. the depictive must be co-initial with the matrix event, and
2. for Object-Oriented depictives, the verb-object-depictive complex must be aspectually compat-
ible with durativity and quantization.
4.3 Lexical aspect and the verb-object-depictive complex
In this chapter, I’ve reviewed the properties of depictives, concentrating on Object-Oriented de-
pictives. Building on the observation in chapter 3 that quantization affects acceptability, we can
see that there is a more general interaction with lexical aspect. Objects are involved in measuring
out the event, but the object being quantized is not always sufficient. In the cases of verbs that
aren’t telic and durative, these features need to be introduced into the overall verb-object-depictive
complex. In the case of durativity, this can be done through gradable adjectives, while for telicity
this can be introduced by appropriate adverbials or absolute adjectives.
If the VP is quantized (telic) and durative, and the object is quantized (i.e. not a Mass noun
or Bare plural), then (object-oriented) depictives can predicate of the object straightforwardly if
the depictive is a SLP. If the depictives is an ILP, then there is a further requirement of having a
change of state reading. If these conditions are not met, then they can be repaired in various ways
by introducing the missing feature into the verb-object-depictive complex in some way.
As we’ve seen for activity and achievement verbs, closed scale adjectives will be more acceptable
as depictives because closed scale adjectives can introduce quantization and durativity into the
complex. The addition of open scale adjectives repairs OODs with achievement verbs, but not
OODs with activity verbs, due to the requirement of quantization for activity verbs. Since quan-
tization can still be introduced into the complex by making the entire VP telic, this explains why
activity verbs with OODs are repaired by directional adverbials, since directional induce telicity
while locatives do not.
In this chapter, I’ve shown how lexical aspect is important for OOD acceptability. In essence,
as long as the relevant combination of features is introduced into the complex, an OOD will be
rendered more acceptable, modulo possible issues with world knowledge. This is an improvement
over previous analyses in not only correctly capturing the variable acceptability of OODs with
different verb classes, but also unites the various properties of depictives.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and future directions
The aim of this thesis has been to give a firmer empirical basis to depictives, and develop a
conceptual framework for analysing their behaviour. I have concentrated on depictives in particular
because they have often been ignored in the study of secondary predicates. Resultatives have
received much more attention, because it is felt that they have a more ‘complex’ event structure
than depictives. This is a shame, as depictives are intriguing because they are both arguments and
adjuncts, and it is precisely these structural and semantic features that allow them to reveal much
more about the structure of the grammar that would be otherwise expected.
In part due to this neglect, there have been many incorrect generalisations about depictives that
have proliferated throughout the literature on secondary predicates. While it has been commonly
observed that OODs are generally more acceptable when predicated of objects of accomplishment
verbs, this observation has often lead to incorrect generalisations; it is still common to see the
claim that depictives must be SLPs, or that OODs cannot be predicated of objects of activity
verbs.
Further, most analyses have been unable to fully account for OOD behaviour. In this thesis, I have
given a novel analysis of adjectival OODs that not only explains this behaviour, but successfully
predicts and captures previously unnoticed interactions with other parts of the grammar. In
particular, I have concentrated on quantization and its role in depictives. Quantization cuts across
a number of different domains of grammar, and the status of quantization in these domains is
especially important in licensing depictives. Quantization in the verbal, nominal, adjectival, and
predicative domain all have effects on the acceptability of depictives, a fact that has been previously
unnoticed. These effects are predicted by my analysis, and unite it with common observations about
the interpretation of depictives.
Building on this, I have shown how adjectival OODs are sensitive to lexical aspect, and that
quantization and durativity condition the acceptability of OODs; a depictive is rendered acceptable
if the conditions of durativity and quantization are met, and acceptability quickly degrades in cases
where these conditions are violated. In essence, the prototypical depictive is one that is durative
and quantized. A depictive exists as a temporary property that holds of the entity it is predicated
of, and must align with the beginning of the main event.
Perhaps the most novel finding of this thesis is that quantization and durativity can be introduced
into the verb-object-depictive complex through various means, and that a structural feature that
corresponds to the required durative or quantized feature leads to a corresponding increase in
the acceptability of the depictive. There are a number of ways that this interaction could be
implemented, but are highly dependent on the system chosen. To this end, I have steered away
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from giving explicit formalisations of depictives, and have kept my analysis largely theory-agnostic,
largely in order to keep focus on the overlooked features of depictives, particularly their interaction
with lexical aspect. We can then return to the two questions highlighted at the end of chapter
2.
1. What determines the restriction on verb classes for OODs?
2. Why are depictives interpreted as being temporary states?
We now see these can be all answered through the relationship of depictives to quantization. In the
case of question 1 and 2, this is fairly direct; OODs with activity verbs are acceptable if quantized in
some manner, and depictives are interpreted as being temporary states because of this quantization
requirement. In terms of question 3, the relationship to quantization is more indirect, but still
strong. Depictives need to align with the beginning of the matrix event, and quantization is related
to this need for a temporal bound to align with. This temporal bound cannot be mere overlap, but
is quantized and is a temporary property (a Stage-Level Predicate), or has a contextually specified
change of state interpretation (in the case of Individual-Level Predicates).
While this thesis has concentrated on capturing the behaviour of depictives otherwise overlooked
in other literature, there still remain a number of questions about depictives, and there are many
potential avenues of further investigation. In the next section, I sketch a few, using some examples
to illustrate them.
5.1 Future directions
5.1.1 Extending the Depictive Aspectuality Constraint
I’ve argued that the Depictive Aspectuality Constraint is a condition that applies stronger to
English OODs than English SODs, because OODs are predicated of the object, which is involved
in measuring out the event. Taking a decompositional approach to lexical aspect (e.g. Travis,
2010), we can split the VP up into VoiceP, AspP, and the bare VP. VoiceP is the site of durativity,
















Figure 5.1: Extended Verb Phrase with Object-Oriented Depictive
I hypothesize that because the OOD is inside AspP, it interacts with the quantization status of the
overall verb-object complex. SODs, on the other hand, are predicated of the external argument
and are Voice′ adjuncts. As such, they are outside the domain of AspP. Because of this, they have
fewer restrictions.
The restrictions on distribution (albeit, less restrictive than OODs) of SODs indicates that depictive
constructions have a set of particular requirements that are preferred, e.g. the SLP preference
holds even for SODs, and change of state interpretations are required. The fact that but that
there are greater restrictions on OODs must be attributed to its position in the overall extended
VP. Further, since OODs predicated of specific objects of accomplishment verbs show the least
amount of restrictions, then it must be concluded that being a lower attached adjunct affects the
requirements for OOD acceptability.
This thesis has argued that (lexical) aspectuality is a key factor for licensing depictives. This then
predicts that structures that affect aspect should show interactions with depictives. For example,
the subjects of unaccusatives and passives can determine the telicity of the sentence, and so are
involved in the computation of the aspect of the sentence (Tenny, 1994). We would then expect
SODs predicated of unaccusatives and passives to behave differently; this predicts that unaccusative
and passive SODs should pattern more like OODs than SODs of other types. While clear data is
difficult to find, we do find suggestive evidence to indicate this might be the case:
(1) a. The shipment arrived pure/??impure
b. The rocket landed undamaged/??damaged
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Like OODs with activity verbs, unaccusatives appear to be more acceptable with closed scale
adjectives, and less acceptable with open scale adjectives. We can see this further comparing
unaccusatives and passives with unergatives.
(2) a. Johni jumped completely/very soberi [Unergative]
b. Johni fell completely/??very soberi [Unaccusative]
c. Johni was pushed completely/??very soberi [Passive, Activity]
Interestingly, passives generated from accomplishments don’t show the verb class restriction, while
for other verb classes they do:
(3) a. The body was found completely/??very cold
b. Mary was found completely/??very drunk
c. The first one was eaten very warm (Google)
d. Entree can be eaten completely cold, directly from the pouch (Google)
Depictives predicated of unaccusative show a number of interesting properties. The acceptability
of (some) depictives seems to be related to the ‘unaccusativity mismatch’ (Levin, 1993), in which
only a subset of unaccusative verbs allow there-insertion. For example:
(4) a. (i) A man arrived
(ii) There arrived a man
b. (i) *A ship sank
(ii) *There sank a ship
There-insertion degrades the acceptability of depictives:
(5) a. (i) Many members were present drunk
(ii) *There were many members present drunk
b. (i) A man arrived drunk
(ii) ?There arrived a man drunk
There-insertion is also well-known to interact with the SLP/ILP distinction (Kratzer, 1995). Dis-
cussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis, but I postulate that this is due to differing
structures for unaccusatives. See e.g. Alexiadou and Schäfer (2010) for discussion with regards to
the unaccusativity mismatch and There-insertion.
On the hypothesis that the subjects of unaccusatives are generated in the object position and
move up, this suggests that an interaction with the object of a sentence is the cause of the re-
striction. This all points to a sensitivity of the depictive to aspect, especially when predicated of
an entity involved in the computation of aspect. Further investigation into depictives and their




Depictives have been studied in a number of different languages that contain features that would
be useful for further investigating the relationship of depictives and lexical aspect. For example,
the development of a depictive marker in Swiss German (Bucheli Berger, 2005) would be useful
in distinguishing depictives from similar constructions. Likewise, Spanish is particularly famous
for the estar/ser copula distinction, which has been tied to the SLP/ILP distinction. Gumiel-
Molina et al. (2016) argue on a similar course for the relevance of the absolute/relative distinction
in adjectives to depictive acceptability. However, as we’ve seen in English, the absolute/relative
distinction faces issues with negative members of adjective pairs. Spanish would be a particularly
useful comparison in seeing whether this is a more general constraint, or a particular property of
English.
Given the focus on lexical aspect in this thesis, we would expect to see depictives differing cross-
linguistically as far as the aspectual system of the language differs. A language with richer mor-
phology could reveal facts about the relationship that are obscured by the relative poverty of case
in English. In particular, given the relevance of telicity/boundedness, a language with a more overt
tie to these distinctions would be very useful in investigating these claims. Finnish, as an example,
has a case system that is argued to be reflective of the telicity/boundedness distinction (Kiparsky,
1998). Essessive case is usually used to marked depictives in Finnish, but the translative case can
also be used (Nikanne, 1997, 02; Fong, 2003; Pylkkanen, 2008; Leinonen, 2008).
Similarly, Russian would be useful for a further exploration of the relationship between case and
depictives. Russian’s aspectual system differs significantly from English, and Russian has a richer
case morphology, both of which serve as useful testing grounds for the analysis I’ve presented in
this thesis. Russian depictives are also sensitive to boundedness (McKishnie, 2013), but have fewer
restrictions on depictives with different verb classes
This difference in aspectual systems has been used before to show a difference between depictive
types; Russian depictives show an interesting split between Case Agreement Depictives (CAD), in
which the depictive has the same case marking as the entity it is predicated of, and Instrumental
Case Marked Depictives (ICMD), in which the depictive is marked with instrumental case (Filip,













I ordered the fish raw
(Data from Richardson, 2001)























Vadim returned from the hospital cured
(Data from Richardson, 2001)
Here, the ICMD is translated as ‘cured’, indicating that Vadim’s state of being healthy had a
transition involving the hospital, whereas the CAD is just describing the state of Vadim on his
return from the hospital. Russian native speakers show strong pragmatic preferences for using
either a CAD or an ICMD over one another for secondary predicates, and usually they entail a
























‘I asked himi to dance nakedi’
(Data from Richardson 2001)
In (8a), agreeing (CAD) and instrumental case (ICMD) have a key semantic difference—for the
CAD, the utter of the sentence is merely naked when coming to dance, whereas for the ICMD,
the speaker wishes to come specifically to dance naked. Similarly, in (8b), the CAD means that
the speaker wants the man to dance as he is (naked), whereas the ICMD means that the speaker
wishes the man to get naked and dance. Compare this to English:
(9) a. Ii came to dance nakedi
b. I asked himi to dance nakedi
It is difficult for many English speakers to interpret (9b) as asking someone to dance and the person
asked to dance was naked at the time. However, we can see that this interpretation shows greater
availability when an absolute scale is forced using a scale modifier:
(10) a. (i) I asked Johni to dance nakedi
(ii) I asked Johni to dance completely nakedi
b. (i) I didn’t ask Johni to dance nakedi... ??he was clothed at the time
(ii) I didn’t ask Johni to dance completely nakedi... he was clothed at the time
This raises the question over whether depictives may differ in their aspectual requirements cross-




In this thesis, I have shown how depictives can be improved in acceptability by introducing formal
features that correspond to quantization and durativity. A central question that remains is the role
of context and how we can separate linguistic restrictions on acceptability from other issues, like
real world knowledge. Certain linguistic items and constructions put limitations on how sentences
can be acceptable. For example, a typical split identified by traditional grammarians is between
Mass nouns and Count nouns, with the former being predominately identified with substances (e.g.
water, gold), while the latter is identified with objects (e.g. dogs, cats). However, one can use
prototypical Mass nouns with Count syntax such as plurals, and this doesn’t necessarily result in
acceptability. But the use leads to a change of interpretation, and only certain interpretations are
allowed:
(11) a. (i) There was water on the table
(ii) There were waters on the table
b. (i) There was a dog on the table
(ii) There was dog on the table
Water in (11ai) can be read either as an amount of water, or a bottle of water, while water in (11ai)
can be read as bottles/types of water or glasses of water for a group, but it cannot be read as an
amount of water as a substance on the table. Conversely, dog in (11bi) means a single, whole dog,
while (11bii) receives the rather gruesome interpretation of an amount of dog (i.e. flesh).
The important point here is that when a lexeme like dog or water is put in a syntactic frame, it
receives the interpretation appropriate to that frame; Mass nouns receive a substance interpretation,
while Count nouns receive an object interpretation. This happens regardless of whether it makes
sense for that lexeme to be associated with a substance or object reading, and is mostly limited in
interpretation by whether a listener is willing to entertain the particular state of affairs that would
have to be in order for the sentence to make sense. In essence, not only does the syntactic frame
partially determine the interpretation of a lexeme, but a listener understands what sort of context
or state of affairs would have to be true in order for the sentence to be acceptable.
We can reverse this line of thought and show that context likewise determines the appropriate
sort of syntactic properties required for an acceptable interpretation. By manipulating the context
that an utterance is interpreted in, we change the syntactic properties that the sentence has. If a
construction requires a particular syntactic property, then this can make an unacceptable sentence
acceptable. I use both of these to address depictives, and demonstrate how depictives can be
improved in certain contexts, and must be interpreted in certain ways.
This ability to satisfy this restriction through quantization in different domains hints at a larger
fact about language. Language grammars have underlying divisions and distinctions in them that
surface in various ways, and interact. These properties are part of the constraints put on possible
meanings of sentences, but they are often obscured by contextual information and ambiguity. We
can see that contextual information and grammatical structure are interdependent, with a degree
of variability accorded to both. However, this variability has limits, and understanding these limits
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and what heightens or decreases them can lead to a more refined understanding of languages in
general.
What I have aimed to show in this thesis is that depictives are a useful construction for exploring
the event structure of a language. With their unique semantic and syntactic properties, depictives
can reveal important facts about depictives. While much more remains to be done in studying
depictives and secondary predicates in general, I hope that the status of and interest in depictives
is raised, and that they receive more attention.
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